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ABSTRACT
In patent law, the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is currently interpreted to
include a written description requirement that is distinct from the requirement of
enabling a person skilled in the art to make and use an invention. However,
analyses of patent specifications under the "written description requirement" have
relied on determinations of whether one skilled in the art would comprehend the
scope of the claimed invention in view of the description provided, in effect continuing
use of enablement as the statutory threshold for description purposes. The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358
F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 629 (2004) (No. 04-476) departs
from considerations of enablement to assess the adequacy of the written description
in a patent specification. The decision by the court in Rochester and Judge Rader's
vigorous dissent may well represent not only departures from legal precedent, but
also the seeds of a split in authority within the Federal Circuit.
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INTRODUCTION
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is currently interpreted to include a
written description requirement that is distinct from the requirement of enabling a
person skilled in the art to make and use an invention. Opinions differ as to whether
a distinction between these requirements has always existed or whether it is a recent
development. From the early nineteenth century, courts relied on knowledge of one
skilled in the art to identify a "principle" or "mode of operation" to distinguish an
invention and to establish the limit of an inventor's exclusive right. During this
time, the understanding of one skilled in the art as applied to patentability and
infringement was closely linked to "interchangeability" and "equivalence" in view of
the written description of a patent specification.
Subsequent to enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, courts began to distinguish
between a statutory requirement of a description of the invention and a statutory
requirement of enablement by one skilled in the art to make and use it, the former
necessitating sufficient demonstration to one skilled in the art that the inventor
"possessed" or "invented" the invention. Analysis of a specification under the
"written description requirement" relied on a determination of whether one skilled in
the art would comprehend the scope of the claimed invention in view of the
description provided, in effect employing enablement as the statutory threshold for
description purposes. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") in
University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.1 departs from considerations of
enablement to assess adequacy of the written description in a patent specification.
Further, opinions issued in a decision denying a petition to rehear this case portend a
fundamental split in authority in the CAFC that, depending on the panel, will
severely limit or deny patent protection.

I. SUMMARY OF UNIVERSITY OFROCHESTER v G.D. SEARLE & Co.: No PROTECTION
FOR THE "PHILOSOPHER'S STONE"
The CAFC in Rochester II affirmed 2 a decision by the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York 3 invaliding U.S. Patent No. 6,048,850

* Mr. Pierce is a principal at Hamilton, Brook, Smith & Reynolds, P.C., in Concord, Mass., and
an Adjunct Professor at Suffolk University Law School. He can be reached at (978) 341-0036 and
scott.pierce@hbsr.com.
1 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. demed, 125 S. Ct.
629 (2004) [hereinafter RochesterIA.
2 Id. at 930.
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 236 (W.D.N.Y. 2003), affd, 358
F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 629 (2004) [hereinafter Rochester ].
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(hereinafter "the '850 patent") for failure to provide a written description of the
claimed invention as required by the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.4 The claims
were directed to a method for selectively inhibiting mammalian prostaglandin H
synthase-2 ("PGHS-2," or "COX-2") in a human host by administering a non-steroidal
compound that selectively inhibits activity of a PGHS-2 gene product. 5 The invention
was based on a discovery by scientists at the University of Rochester of the existence
of PGHS-2 and its association with inflammatory stimuli responsible for pain and
inflammation, and that PGHS-2 has functions distinct from PGHS-I, which provides
benefits such as assistance in protecting the stomach lining. 6 Known pain relievers
employed to inhibit activity of PGHS-2 also inhibited PGHS-I, potentially causing
stomach irritation. Having identified the distinct functions between PGHS-1 and
PGHS-2, the scientists developed an assay for identifying a non-steroidal compound
that would selectively inhibit PGHS-2.7 The '850 patent described that assay, but did
8
not include any compounds identified by its use.
The district court stated that:

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). The pertinent section states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Id.
5Independent claims 1, 5 and 6 of the '850 patent are as follows:
1. A method for selectively inhibiting PGHS-2 activity in a human host,
comprising administering a non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits
activity of the PGHS2 gene product to a human host in need of such treatment.
5. A method for selectively inhibiting PGHS-2 activity in a human host,
comprising administering a non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits
activity of the PGHS2 gene product in a human host in need of such treatment,
wherein the activity of the non-steroidal compound does not result in significant
toxic side effects in the human host.
6. A method for selectively inhibiting PGHS-2 activity in a human host,
comprising administering a non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits
activity of the PGHS-2 gene product in a human host in need of such treatment,
wherein the ability of the non-steroidal compound to selectively inhibit the
activity of the PGHS2 gene product is determined by:
a) contacting a genetically engineered cell that expresses human PGHS-2, and not
human PGHS-I, with the compound for 30 minutes, and exposing the cell to a
pre-determined amount of arachidonic acid;
b) contacting a genetically engineered cell that expresses human PGHS-1, and not
human PGHS-2, with the compound for 30 minutes, and exposing the cell to a
pre-determined amount of arachidonic acid;
c) measuring the conversion of arachidonic acid to its prostaglandin metabolite;
and
d) comparing the amount of the converted arachidonic acid converted by each cell
exposed to the compound to the amount of the arachidonic acid converted by
control cells that were not exposed to the compound, so that the compounds that
inhibit PGHS2 and not PGHS 1 activity are identified.
U.S. Patent No. 6,048,850 (issued April 11, 2000).
GRoehestorl 249 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
7Id.
8 Id. at 224.

[4:406 2005]

University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co

[Tihe real issue here is simply whether a written description of a claimed
method of treatment is adequate where a compound that is necessary to
practice that method is described only in terms of its function, and where
the only means provided for finding such a compound is essentially a
trial-and-error process. 9
Comparing the non-steroidal compound of the '850 patent claims to the "philosopher's
stone," the court found that, without the compound, the patentees could not have
possession of the claimed method of its use. 10 The court stated that, to be an inventor
or patentee, one must demonstrate possession of the invention, 1 and that failure to
provide such a description rendered the patent merely a "wish or plan"12 which was
"an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived." 13 The district court held
that the written description of the specification, as a matter of law, failed to comply
with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and granted defendants'
14
motion for summary judgment because no compound was identified by the assay.
The court also granted a motion for summary judgment of patent invalidity for
9 Id. at 221.
10Id. at 229-30. The court noted:
In effect, then, the '850 patent claims a method that cannot be practiced until one
discovers a compound that was not in possession of, or known to, the inventors
themselves. Putting the claimed method into practice awaited someone actually
discovering a necessary component of the invention. In some ways, this is
reminiscent of the search for the so-called "philosopher's stone," eagerly sought
after by medieval alchemists, which supposedly would transmute lead into gold.
While the Court does not mean to suggest that the inventors' significant work in
this field is on a par with alchemy, the fact remains that without the compound
called for in the patent, the inventors could no more be said to have possessed the
complete invention claimed by the '850 patent than the alchemists possessed a
method of turning base metals into gold.

d.
Id. at 218. The court stated that:
An "inventor" or patentee is entitled to a patent to protect his work but only if he
produces or has possession of something truly new and novel. The "invention"' he
claims must be sufficiently concrete so that it can be described for the world to
appreciate the specific nature of the work that sets it apart from what was before.
The inventor must be able to describe the item to be patented with such clarity
that the reader is assured that the inventor actually has possession and
knowledge of the unique composition that makes it worthy of patent protection.

Id.
12 Id. ("The patent here does not do that. What the reader learns from this patent is a wish or
plan or first step for obtaining a desired result.").
13 Id.
(quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1 Id.at 224. The court stated:
Applying these principles to the case at bar, I conclude that, as a matter of law,
the '850 patent does not comply with the written-description requirement of § 112,
and that defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on that issue.
The patent does no more than describe the desired function of the compound
called for, and it contains no information by which a person of ordinary skill in the
art would understand that the inventors possessed the claimed invention. At
best, it simply indicates that one should run tests on a wide spectrum of
compounds in the hope that at least one of them will work.
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non-enablement on the basis that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have to
engage in undue experimentation, without assurance of success, in order to identify a
15
compound that would selectively inhibit PGHS-2 gene product activity, as claimed.
On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the district court's decision granting summary
judgment invalidating the '850 patent for failure to meet the written description
requirement. The analysis by the CAFC under 35 U.S.C. § 112 began by partitioning
the first paragraph:
Three separate requirements are contained in that provision: (1) "the
specification shall contain a written description of the invention"; (2) "the
specification shall contain a written description . . .of the manner and
process of making and using it [i.e., the invention] in such full, clear, concise
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same"; and (3) "the specification . . . shall set forth the best mode
16
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."
The CAFC relied on Evans v. Eaton17 to aver that the Supreme Court has
recognized the existence of separate written description and enablement
requirements, providing "two objects" for a patent specification, since at least 1822.18
The court distinguished the modern written description requirement from
enablement on the basis of a close similarity of the language between the Patent Acts

15 Id. at 233. The court stated:

What the '850 patent does not do, however, is provide the necessary link between
those two steps: actually finding a compound that works. It provides precious
little guidance in the way of selecting a particular compound, or even of narrowing
the range of candidates in order to find a suitable compound without the need for
undue experimentation.

Id.
16Roehostpr-f, 358 F.3d 916, 921(Fed. Cir.

2004).

17Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
18 Rochestero,
358 F.3d at 924. The court stated:
Indeed, as early as 1822 the Supreme Court recognized the existence of separate
written description and enablement requirements:
[T]he patent act requires .. . that the party [ie., the inventor] "shall
deliver a written description of his invention, in such full, clear, and
exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before
know[n], and to enable any person skilled in the art or science, & c. &
c. to make, compound, and use the same." The specification, then has
two objects: one is to make known the manner of constructing the
machine (if the invention is of a machine) so as to enable artizans [sic]
to make and use it, and thus to give the public the full benefit of the
discovery after the expiration of the patent.... The other object of the
specification is, to put the public in possession of what the party claims
as his own invention, so as to ascertain if he claim anything that is in
common use, or is already known, and to guard against prejudice or
injury from the use of an invention which the party may otherwise
innocently suppose not to be patented.
Id. (quoting Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433-34 (1822)).
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of 1793 and 1952.19 The court further stated that enablement alone is not sufficient
because "an invention may be enabled even though it has not been described ''20 and
presented the following hypothetical: "Such can occur when enablement of a closely
related invention A that is both described and enabled would similarly enable an
21
invention B ifB were described."
Without a description of the compound employed in their method, the court
found that it would be impossible to practice the claimed method of treatment. 22 Like
the district court, the CAFC stated that the inventor must establish that he was in
possession of the claimed invention, even if reduction to practice is only
constructive. 23 Summary judgment for failure to meet the written description
requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was affirmed. 24 The CAFC
25
specifically declined to consider enablement.
Petitions for rehearing and for rehearing en bane the Roehester II decision were
denied. 26 The Order, issued July 2, 2004, was accompanied by two concurring
opinions and three dissenting opinions. Judge Lourie, who wrote the majority
opinion on appeal to the CAFC, concurred in denying the petitions, stating simply
that a written description requirement separate from enablement has always been
required and that a revision of its interpretation is not warranted. 27 Judge Dyk
19Rochester 1, 358 F.3d at 925 ("Although the patent statutes have been extensively revised
since 1822 [when Evans v. Eaton was decided], most notably in the addition of the requirement of
claims, the language of the present statute is not very different in its articulation of the written
description requirement.").
20 Id. at 921.
21 Jd
22 Id.

at 926. The court noted that:

Regardless whether a compound is claimed per se or a method is claimed that
entails the use of the compound, the inventor cannot lay claim to that subject
matter unless he can provide a description of the compound sufficient to
distinguish the infringing compounds from non-infringing compounds, or
infringing methods from non-infringing methods. As the district court observed,
"the claimed method depends upon finding a compound that selectively inhibits
PGHS-2 activity. Without such a compound, it is impossible to practice the
claimed method of treatment."
Id. (quoting Rochester, 249 F. Supp. 2d 216, 228 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)).
23 Id. ("Constructive reduction to practice is an established method of disclosure, but the
application must nonetheless 'describe the claimed subject matter in terms that establish that [the
applicant] was in possession of the . . . claimed invention, including all of the elements and
limitations."'(quoting Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
24 Id. at 929.
25 Id.
at 929-30 ("In view of our affirmance of the district court's decision on the written
description ground, we consider the enablement issue to be moot and will not discuss it further.").
26 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter

Rochester II].
27

Id. at 1305-07 (Lourie, J., concurring).
Contrary to the assertions of the appellant, certain amici, and some of the
dissenters, there is and always has been a separate written description
requirement in the patent law. The requirement to describe one's invention is
basic to the patent law, and every patent draftsman knows that he or she must
describe a client's invention independently of the need to enable one skilled in the
relevant art to make and use the invention. The specification then must also
describe how to make and use the invention (i.e., enable it), but that is a different
task.
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agreed with Judge Lourie that 35 U.S.C. § 112 contains a separate written
description requirement and further stated that, although the court has "yet to
articulate satisfactory standards that can be applied to all technologies" in enforcing
this requirement, Roehester Ilwas not the appropriate case for en bane consideration
of this issue. 28 Judge Newman, in a dissenting opinion, supported the holding, but
argued for rehearing the case en bane to resolve differences of opinion among the
judges.29
Judge Linn, with whom Judges Rader and Gajarsa joined, dissented, stating, in
direct contravention to the opinions of Judges Newman, Lourie, and Dyk, that the
sole measure of the written description requirement was whether it enables one
skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention. 30 Judge Linn argued that,
without enablement and best mode, there is no standard by which to measure
written description and, further, given that the purpose of the claims is to set forth
the metes and bounds of the invention, there is no reason to require a written
31
description that is distinct from enablement.
Judge Rader, who also dissented, and with whom Judges Gajarsa and Linn
joined, provided a much different analysis of the written description requirement.
Specifically, and contrary to the court's opinion, Judge Rader asserted that the only

In sum, I concur in the decision of the court not to rehear this case en bane.
Our precedent is clear and consistent and necessitates no revision of written
description law.

Id.
-d. at 1327 (Dyk, J., concurring).
Id. at 1304 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman stated:
I fully share Judge Lourie's understanding of the law. The continuing
attack on well-established and heretofore unchallenged decisions such as
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar... and earlier cases such as In re Ruschig... is not
only unwarranted, but is disruptive of the stability with which this court is
charged. If precedent has become obsolete or inapplicable, we should resolve the
matter as a court and again speak with one voice.
Id. (citations omitted).
30 -d. at 1325 (Linn, J., dissenting). Judge Linn's dissent states in part:
Section 112 of Title 35 of the United States Code requires a written
description of the invention, but the measure of the sufficiency of that written
description in meeting the conditions of patentability in paragraph 1 of that
statute depends solely on whether it enables any person skilled in the art to which
the invention pertains to make and use the claimed invention and sets forth the
best mode of carrying out the invention.
28
29

Id.
Id. at 1326-27. The judge further dissented:
Construing § 112 to contain a separate written description requirement
beyond enablement and best mode creates confusion as to where the public and
the courts should look to determine the scope of the patentee's right to exclude.
Under the panel's analysis, a court looks to the written description to determine
the parameters of the patentee's invention-under guidelines yet to be
articulated-and then determines if the claims, as properly construed, exceed
those parameters ....
There is simply no reason to interpret section 112 to
require applicants for patent to set forth the metes and bounds of the claimed
invention in two separate places in the application. That is the exclusive function
of the claims.
Id. at 1326-27 (citations omitted).
31
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requirement for a written description under the Patent Act of 1952, apart from
enablement, was established by Judge Rich in 1967 to ensure that an inventor had
possession, as of the filing date of an application, of the subject matter later
32
claimed.
Judge Rader stated that the hypothetical 33 wherein "a patent can enable an
invention that is not described," which was presented by the panel, "rarely, if ever,
happens. No actual case presents the hypothetical." 34 He concluded that "ample
remedies" exist to address the "Rochester hypothetical" in the absence of a separate
35
written description requirement.

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT

A.

Changesin the LiteralLanguage of the Written Deseription
Requirement Since 1790

Section 2 of the Patent Act of

179036

included a requirement that:

[T]he grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the time of granting the
same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing, containing
a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations and
models . . .of the thing or things, by him or them invented or discovered...
37

The Act further required:
[The] specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not
only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before
known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in
the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be
nearest connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the

32Id.

at 1311 (Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Rader noted in his dissent:
Beginning in 1967, this court and its predecessor applied the written description
language to achieve this vital purpose of the Patent Act - tying disclosure to the
time of invention. In the words of Judge Rich, the first judge to use the
description requirement to police priority, "The function of the description
requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of
the application relied on, of the specific subject matter late-rclaimed by him."
Id. (quoting In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (citations omitted).
33 See Roehesterl, 358 F.3d 916, 921(Fed. Cir. 2004).
'1RoehesterIII,375 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, J., dissenting).
35 Id.at 1313 (Rader, J., dissenting) ("In sum, our patent law (and the world's patent law) has
worked well for 200 years because the law already possesses ample remedies for the Rochester
hypothetical, which, as a practical matter, never occurs.").
36 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (Apr. 10, 1790) (repealed 1793) (current version at
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
37 See id. § 2.
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public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent
term .... 3S
According to the literal language of the Patent Act of 1790, therefore, the
specification was required to "distinguish the invention or discovery from other
things before known and used." Separately from the requirement of distinguishing
the invention from other things previously known and used, the specification was
required to "enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or manufacture ...
to make, construct, or use the same." The phrase, "to the end that the public may
have the full benefit thereof, after expiration of the patent term," follows from the
second requirement of the specification, enablement, because distinguishing the
invention from other things before known would not be a benefit to the public that
would continue after expiration of the patent.
The Patent Act of 179339 retained dual requirements of a description that
distinguished the invention from things previously known and of enablement by any
person skilled in the art to make and use the invention. Section 3 of the Act stated:
[Eivery inventor.., shall deliver a written description of his invention, and
of the manner of using, or process of compounding the same, in such full,
clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things
before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science, of
which it is a branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make,
40
compound, and use the same.
Therefore, the Patent Act of 1793 still required that the written description
distinguish the invention from things previously known and separately enable one
skilled in the art to make and use the invention.
In Section 6 of the Patent Act of 1836,41 the requirement that the specification
distinguish the invention from "other things before known" was eliminated, leaving
the written description with the sole requirement "as to enable":
[Hie shall deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and of
the manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding
the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary
prolixity, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it
appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct,
42
compound and use the same ....

38 Id.

3) Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-23 (Feb. 21, 1793) (repealed 1836) (current version at
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
40 Id. § 3.
41Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (July 4, 1836) (repealed 1870) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
42Id. § 6.
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This change was contemporaneous with the insertion of a requirement, in the same
section of the Act, that the inventor "shall particularly specify and point out the part,
43
improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery."
Section 26 of the Patent Act of 187044 incorporated language relating to the
requirements of a written description nearly identical to that of the Patent Act of
1836:
That before any inventor or discoverer shall receive a patent for his
invention or discovery, he shall . . . file in the patent office a written

description of the same, and of the manner and process of making,
constructing, compounding, and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it
appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct,
compound, and use the same .... 45
The Patent Act of 1870, also like that of 1836, required the inventor to particularly
point out what he claimed as his invention or discovery, but included the additional
criterion that he "distinctly claim" his invention:

"...

and he shall particularly point

out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as
his invention or discovery . . . ."46 That the inventor was required by the literal
language of the statute to "distinctly claim" the invention, apart from providing a
specification that included an enabling written description, is evidenced by the last
phrase of Section 26, which separately identifies the specification and claim: " . . .
and said specification and claim shall be signed by the inventor and attested by two
47
witnesses."
Under the Patent Act of 1952,48 United States Code Title 35, Section 112 ("§
112"), the term "specification" embraces both a "written description of the invention,"
and "claims," in the first and second paragraphs, respectively, and includes much of
the language of Section 26 of the Patent Act of 1870. The first and second
paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 112 are as follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.

43 Id.

41Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (July 8, 1870) (repealed 1952) (current version
at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
45
46

Id. § 26.
Id.

47 Id.
48 Patent

§ 112 (2000)).

Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 798 (July 19, 1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C.
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The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
49
regards as his invention.

B. Development ofLegal PrecedentPertainingto the Written Description
Requirement Under the PatentActs of 1793, 1836 and 1870

1. Evans v. Eaton as a Basis for a Separate Written DescriptionRequirement
Evans v. Eaton,50 decided in 1822, was cited by the CAFC in Roehester II as
recognition by the Supreme Court of a written description requirement separate from
enablement since the Patent Act of 1793.51 Judge Rader, in his dissent from the
decision to deny rehearing, stated that the Patent Act of 1793 required that the
written description both distinguish the invention from "other things before known"
and "enable any person skilled in the art."52 He suggested that the court overlooked
the significance of the fact that in 1822 there was no statutory requirement to
separately claim the invention 53 and that omitting the language "to distinguish the
same from all other things before known" in later acts, in conjunction with a
statutory requirement to include claims, could only mean that "enablement became
54
the sole 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 standard for adequate disclosure of an invention."
The literal language of the portion of Section 3 of the Patent Act of 1793
requiring an inventor to "deliver a written description of his invention, as to
49 35

U.S.C. § 112 (2000).

50Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
51 See supra Part I.
52 Rochester 11, 375 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Rader, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Judge Rader
reasoned:
In 1793, the Patent Act, 1 Stat. 318, required an inventor to describe the
scope of the invention in the body of the specification; the Act did not require any
claims. Instead the Act required the inventor to provide "a written description of
his invention, and of the manner of using, or process of compounding the same, in
such full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things
before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science . . .to make,
compound and use the same."
Id. (citations omitted).
53 Id.
at 1310 ("For obvious reasons, Rocheste±r undertakes no further explanation of the
Supreme Court's language. In simple terms, the Supreme Court could not have meant that the
written description portion must provide adequate support for the claims as this court's law
presently requires. Patents did not even contain claims in 1822.").
51Id. Judge Rader further explained:
The Supreme Court clearly linked its "other object" of the specification disclosure
to the portion of the statute requiring the inventor "to distinguish the same from
all things before known." Significantly, that language no longer appears in 35
U.S.C. § 112. Later, in 1870, the Patent Act first articulated the requirement that
applicants define their exclusive right in a distinctly drafted claim. Only one
logical conclusion flows from this history. When the Patent Act assigned the
notice function to claims rather that the written description, enablement became
the sole 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 standard for adequate disclosure of an invention.
Id. (citations omitted).
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distinguish the same from all other things before known .

. . ."

was interpreted in

Evans in view of Section 2, which was directed to the rights of inventors of "original
discoveries" relative to those who patent "improvements."55 As stated by the lower
court in Evans:
If the alleged inventor of a machine, which differs from another previously
patented, merely in form and proportion, but not in principle, is not entitled
to a patent for an improvement, which he cannot be by the 2d section of the
law, he certainly cannot, in a like case, claim a patent for the machine
56

itself.

The lower court and the opinion by the Supreme Court addressed whether, in
the case of an improvement on a flour mill called a "Hopperboy," the inventor was
entitled to the improved invention as a whole or only the part of the invention that
represents the improvement. Further, both the lower court and the Supreme Court
discussed at length whether an improvement must be identified by the inventor as
57
such. The lower court stated the inventor must be aware of the "original,"
explaining that to hold otherwise would grant overly broad protection. 58 However,
the same obligation to describe the portion or feature of a machine that is an
"improvement" is not necessary, according to the lower court, where the invention is
59
an "original machine."

55Patent Act of 1793, ch. I, §2, 1 Stat. 318-23 (Feb. 21, 1793) (repealed 1836) (current version

at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000)).
Provided always, and be it further enacted, That any person, who shall have
discovered an improvement in the principle of any machine, or in the process of
any composition of matter, which shall have been patented, and shall have
obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall not to be at liberty to make, use
or vend the original discovery, nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the
improvement: And it is hereby enacted and declared, that simply changing the
form or the proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree,
shall not be deemed a discovery.
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 361-62 (1822).
Id. at 367 ("The answer to this is, that an improvement necessarily implies an original, and
unless the patentee is acquainted with the original which he supposes he has improved, he must
talk idly, when he calls his invention an improvement.").
58 Id. at 362 ("Because if that superiority amounts to an improvement, he is entitled to a patent
only for an improvement, and not for the whole machine. In the latter case the patent would be too
broad, and therefore void when the patent is single.").
59 Id. at 367-68. The court stated:
If he knows nothing of an original, then his invention is an original, or
nothing: and the subsequent appearance of an original to defeat his patent is one
of the risks, which every patentee is exposed to under our law. As to the supposed
distinction between an improvement on a machine patented, and one not so, there
is nothing in it. In both cases the improvement must be described, but with this
difference:-That in the former case it may be sufficient to refer to the patent and
specification, for a description of the original machine, and then to state, in what
the improvements, or such original consists:-whereas, in the latter case, it would
be necessary to describe the original machine, and also the improvement. The
reason for this distinction is too obvious to need explanation.
56
57
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Counsel for plaintiff, in defense of validity of the patent, argued strenuously that
the subject invention of the patent need not be compared to "things before known or
60
used," but rather, that the specification need "merely to distinguish new from old."
Plaintiffs counsel stated that Section 2 of the Patent Act of 1793 was directed to
rights associated with improvements on previously patented inventions, while
Section 3 spoke to substantive requirements of the written description of any patent,
regardless of whether it represented an "improvement" under Section 2.61
Defendant's counsel argued the opposite, that if the invention was directed to an
improvement, the specification must identify the improvement. 62 Failure to do so
meant either that the patent was void either because the invention was not new or
63
because the patent was overly broad by not distinguishing the point of novelty.
Justice Story, writing for the Supreme Court, referenced Section 2 of the Patent
Act of 1793, stating that an inventor is not entitled to use an "original discovery"
where the invention lies in an improvement of what was previously known, "nor is
the first inventor at liberty to use the improvement." 64 Further, the Court stated
6o

Id. at 375. Plaintiffs counsel asserted:
It was a second error of the Court, to take it for granted, that the improved
Hopperboy was not so described in the specification, as to distinguish it from all
things before known or used, and to enable a person skilled in the art to make it.
It is so described . . . . No one skilled in the art could misapprehend this
description or be misled by it ....
The law does not require of patentees to
describe new and old, but merely to distinguish new from old. Otherwise a patent
would be more complex and voluminous than a Welsh pedigree.

Id.
-d. at 369-70. The plaintiffs counsel further noted:
Indeed, it may well be doubted whether any discrimination is necessary,
where, as in this case, there is but one patent in existence. The second section of
the law speaks of the case of a prior patented machine. The Court would have the
third section to be substantive, without association with the second and sixth
[regarding defenses to infringement such as lack of novelty]. But how can a
patentee describe what he never saw?
Id. at 376-77.
62 Id. at 358. Counsel for the defendant stated:
The patentee ought, in his specification, to inform the person who consults it,
what is new and what is old. He should say, my improvement consists in this,
describing it by words, if he can, or if not, by reference to figures ....
All that is
contended, and that is fully supported by authority, and by the reason of the case,
is, that the specification must, in some way or other, distinguish the new from the
old, the improvement from what was known before, so as to show what the
patented invention is, or else the patent is broader than the invention, and void.
Id. at 389-90.
6 Id.
at 358. Defendant's counsel further stated:
[I]t is confidently submitted, that the patent of Oliver Evans must be considered
as a patent either for the machine or for the improvement.
That if it be for the machine, it is void, because it is fully proved that he was not
the original inventor, but the machine was known and used before.
That if it be for an improvement, it is void, because it is broader than his
invention, and does not specify in what his invention consists, so as to distinguish
it from what was known and used before.
Id. at 394.
64 Id. at 429. The majority set out that:
The Patent Act of the 21st of February, 1793, ch. 11 upon which the validity of our
patents generally depends, authorizes a patent to the inventor, for his invention
61
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that, according to the statute, a mere change in form or proportion will not be
considered to be a discovery. 65 The Court also cited Section 3 of the Patent Act of
1793, and stated that the "specification, then, has two objects":
The third section of the patent act requires, as has already been stated,
that the party 'shall deliver a written description of his invention, in such
full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things
before know [sic], and to enable any person skilled in the art or science, &c.
&c. to make, compound, and use the same.' The specification, then, has two
objects: one is to make known the manner of constructing the machine (if
the invention is of a machine) so as to enable artizans [sic] to make and use
it,and thus to give the public the full benefit of the discovery after the
expiration of the patent .... The other object of the specification is, to put

the public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention, so as
to ascertain if he claim anything that is in common use, or is already
known, and to guard against prejudice or injury from the use of an
invention which the party may otherwise innocently suppose not to be
66
patented.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Act were summarized by stating that the inventor's patent is
valid for a whole machine "only by establishing that it is substantially new in its
67
structure and mode of operation.
If, then, the plaintiff was not entitled to a patent to the invention as a whole, the
question, according to the Court, became whether the patent was valid as an
improvement. 68 Relying again on Section 3 of the Patent Act, which required that
the inventor "shall deliver a written description of his invention .... in such full,
clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known,
and to enable any person skilled in the art or science ...to make, compound, and use
the same," the Court held that the specification must identify the improvements, and
to limit the patent to the improvements. 69 The Court affirmed the judgment of the
or improvement in any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition

of matter not known or used before the application. It also gives to any inventor
of an improvement in the principle of any machine, or in the process of any

composition of matter which has been patented, an exclusive right to a patent for
his improvement; but he is not to be at liberty to use the original discovery, no[r]
is the first inventor at liberty to use the improvement.

Id.
65 Id. ("It also declares that simply changing the form or the proportion of any machine or
composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery.").
6 d. at 433-34.

67Id. at 430. The majority noted:

From this enumeration of the provisions of the act, it is clear that the party
cannot entitle himself to a patent for more than his own invention; and if his
patent includes things before known, or before in use, as his invention, he is not
entitled to recover, for his patent is broader than his invention. If, therefore, the
patent be for the whole of a machine, the party can maintain a title to it only by
establishing that it is substantially new in its structure and mode of operation.

Id.
68 Id. at 432-33.
69Id. at 434-35. The court asserted that:
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circuit court invalidating the patent because the patent did not specifically identify
0
the improvements over a previously known Hopperboy, as such.'
Justice Livingston, in a dissenting opinion, disputed the interpretation of the
statute by the majority. 71 Specifically, he stated that the law does not require
identifying in what particulars the patented improvement lay.7 2 Justice Livingston
stated that, if the improved machine is distinguishable upon comparison with known
machines, "the words and the objects of the invention are satisfied," 73 and that those
objects are limited to guarding the public against violation of the patent and
enablement of the public to practice the invention upon expiration of the patent:
The law appears to have nothing else in view, in requiring a specification,
then [sic] the instruction of the public; that is,to guard them against a
violation of the patented improvement, and to enable them, when the
letters patent expire, from the specification filed, to make a machine similar
to the one which had been patented. The only inquiry, therefore, ought to
be, whether this obvious intention of the legislature has been answered by
the particular specification which may be the subject of litigation; and if
enough appears, either to prevent a person from encroaching on the right of
the patentee, or to enable a skillful person to make a machine which shall

The specification must describe the invention "in such full, clear, and distinct
terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known." How can
that be a sufficient specification of an improvement in a machine, which does not
distinguish what the improvement is, nor state in what it consists, nor how far
the invention extends? Which describes the machine fully and accurately, as a
whole, mixing up the new and old, but does not in the slightest degree explain
what is the nature or limit of the improvement which the party claims is his own?
It seems to us perfectly clear that such a specification is indispensable. We do not
say that the party is bound to describe the old machine; but we are of opinion that
he ought to describe what his own improvement is, and to limit his patent to such
improvement.

Id.
70 Id.at

435. The court finally stated:
We do not consider that the opinion of the Circuit Court differs, in any
material respect, from this exposition of the patent act on this point; and if the
plaintiffs patent is to be considered as a patent for an improvement upon an
existing Hopperboy, it is defective in not specifying that improvement, and
therefore the plaintiff ought not to recover.

Id.
71

-d. at 441 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Justice Livingston stated:

2 Id.

We have seen already that the law prescribes no precise form of
specification, which would have been impracticable, and imposes no obligation to
describe, in any particular mode, the machine in question. Not a word is said as
to showing in what particulars the improvement patented differs from all other
machines for the same purpose then in use.

Id.
73 Id. ("If, on the whole description taken together, the machine of the plaintiff can be
distinguished from other machines when compared with his, the words and the objects of the law
are satisfied.").
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not only resemble the one patented, but produce the like effect; more ought
74
not to be required.
The issues presented by Evans, then, were whether the plaintiffs patent was
directed to a machine that was original or an improvement of a previously-known
machine and, if an improvement, whether the specification required delineation of
the features that constitute the improvement over previously known machines. The
majority held that the plaintiffs invention was an improvement on that which was
previously known and that the inventor was obligated to identify in the description
where the improvement lay. 75 The dissent, on the other hand, stated that so long as
the invention, as described, was distinct from previously known devices, the
specification was adequate because the law did not require a list of features that
76
specifically constitute the improvement.
Although the majority and dissenting opinions in Evans differed as to whether
the specification, where the patented invention represents an improvement, must
specifically state where the improvement lay, or whether it is sufficient merely to
describe an invention that is, in fact, different from that which has gone before, both
opinions agreed on the policy objectives of the statute setting the requirements of the
specification. In particular, both opinions agreed that the objectives of the statute
included enabling the public to benefit from the inventors' discovery after expiration
of the patent, and putting the public on notice as to the scope of the invention as a
warning against encroachment.
The issue in Evans was intimately tied to a statutory requirement that the
specification distinguish the invention from "all other things before known." As
discussed above, the Patent Act of 1836 did not include this language, but instead
required that the inventor "particularly specify and point out the part, improvement,
or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery." 77 The explicit
requirement in the Patent Act of 1870 that the inventor "shall particularly point out
and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims is his
invention or discovery,"78 met the "other object" of the specification identified in
Evans, of putting "the public in possession of what the party claims as his own
invention, so as to ascertain if he claim[s] anything that is in common use, or is
already known," and guarding "against prejudice or injury from the use of an
79
invention which the party may otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented."
Further, the requirement of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that "the
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention"
is consistent with denial of protection to an applicant whose specification does not
call out which among the listed features constitutes an improvement over things
before known, as was the case in Evans.

74Id.

at 441-42.

7,Id. at 435.
76Id. at 441-44.
77 See

78 Id.
79 Id.

supra Part II.A.
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Contrary to the CAFC's analysis in Rochester , support for a "separate" written
description requirement under the Patent Act of 1952 cannot be found by drawing a
parallel with the Patent Act of 1793 because the "other object" of the written
description requirement of the specification was met by the introduction of a
statutory requirement for claims.

2.

'Mere Colorable Differences"." Relevant Developments in Patentability and
Infringement Priorto the PatentAct of 1952

At least as early as 1814, a parallel was drawn between patentability and
infringement in view of the "principle" or "mode of operation" of an invention or
8
machine. As stated by Circuit Justice Story in Odiorne v. Winkley 0:
The first question for consideration is, whether the machines used by the
defendant are substantially, in their principles and mode of operation, like
the plaintiffs machines. If so, it was an infringement of the plaintiffs
patent to use them, unless some of the other matters offered in the defense
are proved. Mere colorable alterations of a machine are not sufficient to
protect the defendant. The original inventor of a machine is exclusively
entitled to a patent for it. If another person invents an improvement on
such machine, he can entitle himself to a patent for such improvement only,
and does not thereby acquire a right to patent and use the original machine;
and if he does procure a patent for the whole of such machine with the
improvement, and not for the improvement only, his patent is too broad and
therefore void. It is often a point of intrinsic difficulty to decide whether
one machine operates upon the same principles as another .

. .

.

The

material question, therefore, is not whether the same elements of motion, or
the same component parts are used, but whether the given effect is
produced substantially by the same mode of operation, and the same
combination of powers, in both machines. Mere eolorable differences, or
81
slight improvements, cannot shake the right of the originalinventor.
Therefore, the court in Odiorne stated that when the "given effect is produced
substantially by the same mode of operation" as that of a patented machine, the
differences between the machines are "mere colorable differences, or slight
improvements" that do not protect against a finding of infringement.8 2 By stating
that such differences "cannot shake the right of the original inventor," the court
further suggested that identification of the principle of an improvement was a test of
both infringement of the patent and of the patentability of the improvement.
In Gray v. James,83 decided in 1817, the Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania held in an infringement action that a claimed invention by Perkins was
not shown to operate by the same mode as a machine described in an earlier patent
80 Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814).
81 Id. at 582 (emphasis added).
82Id.
83Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1019 (C.C.D. Penn. 1817).
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by Chandler. In particular, the Chandler patent was not a reference against Perkins
because the description in the Chandler patent was insufficient to determine whether
they operated by the same mode, or principle:
But the important difference is in the mode of operating. Perkins'[ machine
makes the nail by one and the same pressure of the lever, Chandler's, so far
as the court can perceive, effects nothing more by the pressure of the lever,
than the cutting of the nail rod; but, by what power the side or horizontal
levers which form the head, are moved, does not appear, otherwise than as
it is stated in the specification, to be by the action of what is called
secondary levers, or the axes of a wheel during its revolutions. But, by
what power are these secondary levers or wheel[s] worked?

.

.

.

In short,

the court finds it impossible to discover in what manner the complicated
parts of this machine are worked, beyond the pressure of the lever which
cuts the nail ....

The one operates by means of a single power; the other by

the aid of more than one power. Or, if this be not so, it behooves the
defendants clearly to show the contrary, before the court can listen to a
motion to set aside the verdict, on the ground that the two machines are
84
substantially alike in principle.
Therefore, the general description in an earlier patent to Chandler of forming a nail
by an apparatus that, like Perkins' nail cutter, included a lever to cut a nail rod, did
not foreclose Perkins' right to a patent. In other words, until the mode of operation
by which the device disclosed by Chandler could be shown, the court assumed that
the principle of operation was different, thereby obviating the challenge to Perkins'
right to a patent to the nail-making machine described.
In Davis v. Palmer,decided by the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia five
years after Evans, Circuit Justice Marshall held, in an action for infringement of a
patent directed to a mould-board of a plow, that although the principle of the
improvement was clearly stated in the specification as that of working the
mould-board "to circular or spheric lines," as opposed to straight lines ,5 the patentee
was limited to the particular embodiment shown.8 6
Nevertheless, the court
responded to requests by the defendant to modify jury instructions relating to
infringement, to the standard by which patentability of the invention was to be
determined, and to sufficiency of the description in the specification of the plaintiffs
patent. With respect to infringement, the court stated that:

84 Id. at 1020.
85 Davis v. Palmer,

7 F. Cas. 154, 157 (C.C.D. Va. 1827) ("[J]nstead of working the moulding
part, or face of the mould-board to straight lines, my improvement is to work it to circular or spheric
lines." (quoting the plaintiff)).
86 Id. The court stated:
We are then decidedly of opinion, that a mould-board conforming to the particular
description contained in the specification, is the invention which the plaintiff
claims, and that instead of being a mere illustration of the principle stated in the
introductory part of the specification, it is itself the essential improvement, of
which only a general idea was given in the introductory part.
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The patent, undoubtedly, covers only the improvement precisely described.
But if the imitation be so nearly exact as to satisfy the jury that the
imitator attempted to copy the model, and to make some almost
imperceptible variation, for the purpose of evading the right of the patentee,
this may be considered as a fraud on the law, and such slight variation be
87
disregarded.
Similarly, with respect to patentability, the court stated that not every change in
form or proportion is fatal, despite the language of Section 2 of the Patent Act of
1793:
In construing this provision [of Section 2 of the Patent Act of 1793], the
word "simply," has, we think, great influence. It is not every change of form
and proportion which ios [sic] declared to be no discovery, but that which is
simply a change of form or proportion, and nothing more. If, by changing
the form and proportion, a new effect is produced, there is not simply a
88
change of form and proportion, but a change of principle also.
With respect to the written description, the defendant requested that the jury be
instructed that it "must be satisfied that the former mould-board is described with
8 9
sufficient certainty, to distinguish between it and the improvement claimed."
Contrary to the defendant's request, the court found that a description that
distinguished between a former mould-board and the patentee's improvement was
unnecessary. 90 Rather, only a general reference to mould-boards, or one commonly
known, was required, along with a description of patentee's improvement "as will
enable a workman to distinguish what is new." 91
Therefore, even under the Patent Act of 1793,92 which predated any requirement
for claims, and subsequent to Evans, the written description requirement was
interpreted to require only that patentee provide a description of his improvement
"enab[ling] a workman to distinguish what is new." 93
Moreover, all three
modifications to the jury instructions in Davis reflect an underlying policy of
protecting an inventor's right against imitators in exchange for providing to the
public notice and an enabling description of his improvement. The defendant's
requested jury instruction requiring more of the written description, i.e., "that the
former mould-board is described with sufficient certainty, to distinguish between it
and the improvement claimed," was specifically denied by the court.

88

Id. at 159.
Id.

89

Id.

87

90 Id.
91

Id.

The court stated that:

We do not think a particular description of the former mould-board is necessary.
A general reference to it, either in general terms which are not untrue, or by
reference to a particular mould-board, commonly known, accompanied by such a
description of the improvement as will enable a workman to distinguish what is
new, will be sufficient

Id.
92

See supra Part H.A.

9

Davis, 7 F. Cas. at 159.
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Infringement and patentability were explicitly compared in a dissenting opinion
in the Supreme Court case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,94 decided in 1851, after
enactment of the Patent Act of 1836. 9 5 The majority held that a patent directed to a
door knob made of potter's clay was void for lack of ingenuity or skill other than that
of an ordinary mechanic.

96

In the dissenting opinion, Justice Woodbury stated that,

in his view, "the true test of its being patentable was if the invention was new, and
better and cheaper than what preceded it."97 Further, Justice Woodbury stated that
such a test is the same as that employed to determine whether patented subject
matter is sufficiently distinct so as to avoid infringement of an earlier patent, thereby
applying the same standard to both infringement and patentability: "Whenever the
kind of test adopted below is used otherwise than to see if there has been an
infringement or not, it is to ascertain whether the invention is original or not, that is,
98
whether it is a trifling change and merely colorable or not."

Among the references relied upon for this proposition by Justice Woodbury 99 was
Lowell v. Lewis,100 which, like Odiorne, based infringement on whether the accused
device was "substantially" the same invention claimed by the patent holder. 10 1 In
Lowell, decided by the Circuit Court of the United States for the First Circuit in
1817, infringement was determined by whether the pump described in a patent to the
plaintiff, Mr. Perkins, was substantially the same as that of the defendant, Mr.
Baker. 10 2 Whether the pumps of Mr. Perkins and Mr. Baker were, in fact, the "same
invention" was determined by whether the differences were merely in "form or
10 3
proportion," because such differences could not be the basis for a "new invention."
The reliance on Lowell by the dissenting opinion in Hotehkiss means that, as late as
1851, after the patent statute had been changed to delete the explicit requirement
94

Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248, 268-70 (1851) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).

95 See supra Part II.A.
96 Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267. The majority stated:

[F]or unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the
shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain
knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,
there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the
work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.

Id.
97

98

Id. at 268 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
Id. at 269.

99 Id.
100 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
101Id. at 1019-20.
102 Id. at 1021.
103

Id.
Another (and under the circumstances of this case, probably the most
material) inquiry is, whether the defendant has violated the patent right of the
plaintiff, and that depends upon the fact, whether the pumps of Mr. Perkilns and
of Mr. Baker are substantially the same invention. I say substantially the same
invention, because a mere change of the form or proportions of any machine
cannot per so be deemed a new invention. If they are the same invention, then
Mr. Perkins, being clearly the first inventor, is entitled exclusively to the patent
rights, although Mr. Baker may have been also an original inventor, for the law
gives the right, as among inventors, to him, who is first in time.
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that the written description distinguish the invention from "other things before
known," at least one Supreme Court justice (albeit in dissent) was hinging
patentability and infringement on whether the invention, as described by the
patentee, differed from the prior art (in the case of patentability) or an accused device
(in the case of infringement) in ways that were "merely colorable."
In Winans v. Adam, 10 4 the Supreme Court focused on whether a patentee's claim
to an invention should be limited to the literal form of the claim or whether it should
embrace embodiments that were substantially the same, in principle and mode of
operation.105 The plaintiff had requested the circuit court to instruct the jury with
respect to infringement, as follows:
[Tihat what they had to look at was not simply whether, in form and
circumstances, which may be more or less immaterial, that which had been
done by the defendant varied from the specification of the plaintiffs patent,
but to see whether, in substance and effect, the defendants, having the
same object in view as that set forth in the plaintiffs specification, had,
since the date thereof, constructed cars which, substantially, on the same
principle and on the same mode of operation, accomplished the same
106
result.
This language, according to the plaintiff, "was taken verbatim, nearly" from an
instruction to the jury in an earlier case, Walton v. Potter, which was another
instance where patentability was compared with infringement. 10 7 The plaintiff then
cited several cases where patentability and infringement were determined by
ascertaining whether a difference from an earlier device (in the case of patentability),
or a difference from a device of a patent (in the case of infringement), were
differences in principle and mode of operation, or were merely either colorable
differences or a substitution of mechanical equivalents.108 For example, with respect
to patentability, the plaintiff referenced Huddart v. Grimshaw.109 Regarding
111
infringement, the plaintiff cited Russell v. Cowley11 ° and Morgan v. Seaward.
The
Winans v.Adam, 56 U.S.(15 How.) 330 (1853).
Id. at 338-39.
106Id.at 334 (quoting the request by the plaintiff) (emphasis added).
107 Id. Specifically, as recited by the plaintiff in Winans with respect to Walton:
It is in this case [Walton] that C.J. Tindal says, "That if a man has by dint of his
own genius and discovery, after a patent has been obtained, been able to give the
public, without reference to the former one, or borrowing from the former one, a
new and superior mode of arriving at the same end, there can be no objection to
his taking out a patent for that purpose. But he has no right whatever to take, if I
may so say, a leaf out of his neighbor's book, &c."
Id.(citations omitted).
108 Id.at 337.
10) Huddart v. Grimshaw, 1 Web. Pat. Cases, 85. "Ifthe tube and the plate were the same,
104

105

substantially, the difference being colorable only, then the patent was void, otherwise it was good;
and the question was left to the jury, who found for the plaintiff." Winans v. Adam, 56 U.S. 330, 335
(1853).
110 Russell v. Cowley, 1 Web. Pat. Cases, 457. "This was the case of a patent for welding iron
tubes, by drawing them, at a welding heat, through a conical hole. The infringement was the
passing them between rollers; and the question of colorable or substantial difference was referred to
the jury." Winans, 56 U.S. at 335.
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plaintiff quoted Crossley v. Beverly as follows: "[T]he scientific men, all of them, said,
'the moment a practical, scientific man has got that principle in his head, he can
multiply without end, the forms in which that principle can be made to operate.' "112
This reasoning was applied by the plaintiff to his claimed invention in Winans:
As in the case under discussion; the moment a practical, scientific man
is furnished with the idea of giving to the car a shape which will, by
dispensing with the framing obdinarily [sic] used, enable him to make it
lighter in production to its load, than it has ever been made before, he can
multiply without end the forms in which this principle can be made to
113
operate.
The plaintiff concluded that the test of infringement must be whether the accused
railroad cars of the defendant were "substantially, in principle and mode of
114
operation, within the plaintiffs patent."
The defendant, on the other hand, argued that an invention, as claimed, is
confined to that form; the principle of the invention and the form of the claim are one
and the same.11 5 In other words, the defendant argued that infringement should be
limited to the literal scope of the patent claim.
The majority opinion delivered by Justice Curtis held that the principle and
mode of operation established both patentability and the scope of a claim.11 6 The

111 Morgan v. Seaward, 1 Web. Pat. Cases, 167. "Therefore, the two machines were alike in
principle; one man was the first inventor of the principle, and the other has adopted it; and though
he may have carried it into effect by substituting one mechanical equivalent for another, still you
(the jury) are to look to the substance, and not the mere form, and if it is in substance an
infringement, you ought to find so." Winans, 56 U.S. at 335 (quoting Morgan).
112 Winans, 56 U.S. at 336 (quoting Crossley v. Beverly, 1 Web. Pat. Cases, 144).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 332. Counsel for the plaintiff went on to state:
Still the question must always be, whether, whatever the shape he adopts, he is
not availing himself of the principle first suggested by the patentee; a question
which, in a court of law, is at all times a question not for the court, but the jury;
after the former shall have given to the specification that construction which is to
govern the latter in determining whether the infringement complained of falls,
substantially, in principle and mode of operation, within the plaintiffs patent.
Id.at 336.
115 Id.at 337-38. Defendant's counsel stated:
But the claim is confined to a single form, and only through and by that form to
the principles which it embodies; and if, out of the many forms embodying more or
less perfectly the same mode of operation, the plaintiff in error has made his
choice of the best, he is confined to that choice and the rejection which it involves
of all other forms less felicitous .... Where the invention consists of a principle
embodied in a single form, the form is the principle and the principle the form,
and there can be no violation of the principle without the use of the form.
Id.(citations omitted).
116Id.at 341. The majority wrote:
Under our law a patent cannot be granted merely for a change of form ....
[T]o change the form of an existing machine, and by means of such change to
introduce and employ other mechanical principles or natural powers, or, as it is
termed, a new mode of operation, and thus attain a new and useful result, is the
subject of a patent. Such is the basis on which the plaintiffs patent rests.
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majority cited Davis v. Palmer1 17 as an instance where the patent is limited to the
particular form "described and claimed." 118 However, the Court distinguished such
cases, not on the basis that the inventor was limited in the scope of protection to
what literally was described and claimed, but rather that the form disclosed by the
patentee was the only form "capable of embodying the invention."11 9 The court held
that the jury must decide infringement according to whether the defendant's claims
were "the same in kind, and effected by the employment of his [the plaintiffs] mode
120
of operation in substance."
The dissenting opinion also relied on Davis v. Palmer, but argued that the
specification and claim determine the limit of an invention.1 21 This position was
grounded in the concern that failure to confine a patentee's right to the literal bounds
of his claim, in effect, creates no bounds for the claim at all.1 22 The danger of not
Its substance is a new mode of operation, by means of which a new result is
obtained. It is this new mode of operation which gives it the character of an
invention, and entitles the inventor to a patent; and this new mode of operation is,
in view of the patent law, the thing entitled to protection ....
Now, while it is undoubtedly true, that the patentee may so restrict his claim as
to cover less than what he invented, or may limit it to one particular form of
machine, excluding all other forms, though they also embody his invention, yet
such an interpretation should not be put upon his claim if it can fairly be
construed otherwise, and this for two reasons:
1. Because the reasonable presumption is, that, having a just right to cover and
protect his whole invention, he intended to do so.
2. Because specifications are to be construed liberally, in accordance with the
design of the Constitution and the patent laws of the United States, to promote
the progress of useful arts, and allow inventors to retain to their own use, not
anything which is matter of common right, but what they themselves have
created.
Id. (citations omitted).
117 Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154, 157 (C.C.D. Va. 1827).
118 Winans, 56 U.S. at 343 (citations omitted) ("Undoubtedly, there may be cases in which the
letters-patent do include only the particular form described and claimed. Davis v. Palmerseems to
have been one of those cases. But they are in entire accordance with what is above stated.").
119 Id. ("The reason why such a patent covers only one geometric form, is not that the
patentee has described and claimed that form only; it is because that form only is capable
of embodying his invention; and, consequently, if the form is not copied, the invention is not
used.")
120 Id. at 344. Justice Curtis Held, in particular:
It must be the same in kind, and effected by the employment of his mode of
operation in substance. Whether, in point of fact, the defendants' cars did copy
the plaintiffs invention, in the sense above explained, is a question for the jury,
and the court below erred in not leaving that question to them upon the evidence
in the case, which tended to prove the affirmative.
Id.
121 Id. at 345 (Campbell, J. dissenting). ("We are authorized to conclude, that his precise and
definite specification and claim were designed to ascertain exactly the limits of his invention. Davis
v. Palmer, 2 Brock 298.").
122 Id. at 347. In his dissent, Justice Campbell stated:
The claim of to-day is, that an octagonal car is an infringement of this
patent. Will this be the limit to that claim? Who can tell the bounds within which
the mechanical industry of the country may freely exert itself? What restraints
does this patent impose in this branch of mechanical art?
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limiting patent construction was foreseen and provided for, according to the dissent,
by the requirement that the invention be described in enabling terms and,
separately, that the inventor particularly specify and point out what the inventor
claims as his invention:
This danger was foreseen, and provided for, in the patent act. The patentee
is obliged, by law, to describe his invention, in such full, clear, and exact
terms, that from the description, the invention may be constructed and
used. Its principle and modes of operation must be explained; and the
invention [sic] shall particularly "specify and point" out what he claims as
his invention. Fullness, clearness, exactness, preciseness, and particularity,
in the description of the invention, its principle, and of the matter claimed
to be invented, will alone fulfill the demands of Congress or the wants of the
123
country.
The dissent concluded that, "[i]n this case the language of the patent is full,
clear, and exact. The claim is particular and specific." 124 In effect, the dissent
asserted that the statutory requirements (Patent Act of 1836) for the specification
also defined the scope of protection: the specification must include a written
description in such full, clear and exact terms as to enable a person skilled in the art
to practice the invention; in the case of a machine, the "principle and the several
modes" contemplated were to be explained; and the inventor was to particularly
"specify and point out" what he claimed to be his invention. 125
1 26
The Supreme Court case of White v. Dunbar
was an infringement suit decided
following enactment of the Patent Act of 1870, which explicitly required inclusion of
claims. 127 The Court held that, in a reissued patent, substituting the limitation of
"textile fabric" with "enveloping material" between a metal can and shrimp contained
within the can, the reissued claim was broadened impermissibly and that, therefore,

id.
123Id.
124

Id.

See Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (July 4, 1836) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 112
(2000)). This section reads in pertinent part:
[H]e shall deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and of the
125

manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms . . . as to enable any person skilled in

the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same; and in case of any

machine, he shall fully explain the principle and the several modes in which he
has contemplated the application of that principle or character by which it may be
distinguished from other inventions; and shall particularly specify and point out
the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or
discovery.
Id.
126
127

White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47 (1886).
See., e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ("Claim practice did

not achieve statutory recognition until the passage of the Act of July 1836 and inclusion of a claim
did not become a statutory requirement until 1870, Act of July 8 ...." (citations omitted)).
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it was unlawfully granted. 128 Specifically, the Court found that there was nothing in
the description to support broadening protection beyond use of a textile fabric, 129 and
by limiting the claim to a lining of textile fabric, the patentees were declaring that
130
they claimed nothing more.
The Court stated that, although the specification may be referred to in order to
understand the meaning of a claim, it is not to be used to change the claim. 131 The
policy behind refusing to interpret a claim beyond its literal scope, as expressed by
the Court, was to force the patentee to explicitly define his invention in fairness to
1 32
the public.
Neither in the case of Winans nor in White was there literal support for the
claim scope required to recover for infringement by a competitor.133 However,
Winans was decided prior to the Patent Act of 1870.134 The Court in that case based
its holding on the "mode of operation" of the patentee's invention as compared to that
of a defendant's machine.1 35 The Court in White, on the other hand, and as just
mentioned, was decided after enactment of the Patent Act of 1870.136 In contrast to
Winans, the Court in White made no attempt to derive any principle or mode of
128 White, 119 U.S. at 52 ("In our judgment the reissued patent in this case was unlawfully
granted, and the bill should have been dismissed.").
129 Id. at 49. Justice Bradley wrote for the majority:
The claim in the original patent was for placing textile fabric between the can and
its contents; whilst in the reissue it is for interposing between the metal can and
the shrimps an enveloping material for the shrimps. This is certainly, on its face,
a very important enlargement of the claim; and we see nothing in the context of

the specification in the original patent which could possibly give the claim so
broada construction.
Id. (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 51. The Court further noted:
We see nothing in all this to raise the slightest implication that the
patentees were the inventors of the process of interposing any and every kind of
lining between the cans and their contents; and when their claim is confined to a
lining of textile fabric, it is tantamount to a declaration that they claimed nothing
else.

Id.
131 I. In support of their findings, the Court looked at:

Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax
which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the
specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something
different from, what its words express.
The context may, undoubtedly, be
resorted to, and often is resorted to, for the purpose of better understanding the
meaning of the claim; but not for the purpose of changing it, and making it
different from what it is.

Id. at 51-52.
132

Id. at 52. The Court re-established that:
The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making
the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public,
as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the
plain import of its terms.

Id.
133 Compare Winans v. Adam, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854), with White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47
(1886).
(14 See generallyWinans v. Adam, 56 U.S. 330 (1854).
135 Id. at 344.
136 See generallyWhite v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47 (1886).
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operation from the specification and relied solely on the literal language of the
specification and original claim, essentially adopting the position of the dissent in
Winans by requiring not only that the patentee "particularly 'specify and point' out
what he claims as his invention," but that he "describe his invention, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms, that from the description, the invention may be
137
constructed and used."
Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products Co., held that the defendant, employing
silicates of calcium and manganese, infringed a patent claim to a combination of
alkaline earth metal silicate and calcium fluoride. 138 In support of its holding, the
139
Court argued that a patentee should be protected from "the unscrupulous copyist."
The doctrine relied upon by the court was based on Winans (referred to by the Court
as "Winans v. Denmead') and, according to the Court, could be invoked to enforce a
patent against a device "if it performs substantially the same function in
140
substantially the same way to obtain the same result."
The factors to be considered in determining whether a device was equivalent to
claimed subject matter included, according to the Court in Graver Tank, knowledge
141
of the "interchangeability" of ingredients by those "reasonably skilled in the art."
Given that manganese and magnesium were considered to be equivalent as
components of welding flux, the Court found that failure to provide an explanation or
142
indication of independent research inferred "imitation" by the defendant.
137Id. at 52; see also finans, 56 U.S. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
138

Graver Tank v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950).
at 607. For the majority, Justice Jackson wrote:
But courts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a patented
invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the
protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation
would leave room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous copyist to make
unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which,
though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the
claim, and hence outside the reach of law.

139 Id.

Id.
140 Id. at 608. Specifically, the Court further reasoned that:
The essence of the doctrine [of equivalents] is that one may not practice a fraud on
a patent. Originating almost a century ago in the case of Winans v. Denmead,it
has been consistently applied by this Court in the lower federal courts, and it
continues today to be ready and available for utilization when the proper
circumstances for its application arise. 'To temper unsparing logic and prevent an
infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention' a patentee may invoke this
doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device 'if
it performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.'
Id. (citations omitted).
141 Id. at 609 ("An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have
known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.").
142 Id. at 612. The court noted:
Specialists familiar with the problems of welding compositions understood that
manganese was equivalent to and could be substituted for magnesium in the
composition of the patented flux and their observations were confirmed by the
literature of chemistry. Without some explanation or indication that Lincolnweld
was developed by independent research, the trial court could properly infer that
the accused flux is the result of imitation rather than experimentation or
invention.
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In their dissenting opinions, Justices Black and Douglas criticized the court for
departing from the precedent of White. 143 They also stated that application of a
doctrine of equivalents unjustly deprives the public of notice and "emasculates" the
portion of the statute that provides that an application shall "particularly point out
and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims is his
invention or discovery," and that Congress explicitly provided for errors made by
patentees, such as not claiming the full breadth of an invention to which he is
entitled, by reissue. 144 According to the dissent, Congress entrusted the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), rather than the courts, with "initial authority" to
145
determine whether claim scope should be expanded.
The majority decision of Graver Tank continued the doctrine of Winans, whereby
claim scope was determined by equivalence of the mode or principle of the
invention,1 46 despite the explicit statutory requirement imposed after Winans by the
Patent Act of 1870,147 and despite the post-1870 holding in White, limiting claim
scope to the explicit embodiments of the specification.1 4 8
The Court found
equivalence in the case of Graver Tank because the accused product performed
"substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result," and stated that the differences between the patent claims and the accused
product were "colorable" only.149
Engineering Development Laboratories v. Radio Corp. of America1 50 was an
appeal of an infringement suit decided in 1946, prior to Graver Tank. In Engineering
Development Lahoratorie, Judge Learned Hand, for the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, addressed the question of whether claim amendments filed in a
Id. at 614 (Black and Douglas, J.J., dissenting). Justices Black and Douglas noted:
Today the Court . . . departs from the underlying principle which, as the Court
pointed out in White v.Dunbar, forbids treating a patent claim like a nose of wax
which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the
specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something
different from, what its words express ....
Id. (citations omitted).
144 Id. at 614-15.
Justices Black and Douglas further discussed the "emasculation" of the
statute:
In seeking to justify its emasculation of R.S. § 4888 [35 U.S.C. § 33,
providing that an applicant "shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the
part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery"]
by parading potential hardships which literal enforcement might conceivably
impose on patentees who had for some reason failed to claim complete protection
for their discoveries, the Court fails even to mention the program for alleviation of
such hardships which Congress itself has provided. 35 U.S.C. § 64 authorizes
reissue of patents where a patent is "wholly or partly inoperative" due to certain
errors arising from "inadvertence, accident, or mistake" of the patentee.
"1

Id.
145 Id.at 615 ("Congress was careful to hedge the privilege of reissue by exacting conditions. It
also entrusted the Patent Office, not the courts, with initial authority to determine whether
expansion of a claim was justified.").
146 See generallyWinans v. Adam, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 336 (1854).
147 Id.
148

See supratext accompanying note 129.

149Graver Tank v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950) ("Though the infringement
was not literal, the changes which avoid literal infringement are colorable only.").
150 153 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1946).
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reissue application constituted an impermissible broadening of the invention. 151 The
reasoning of the court was very much like the infringement test that would be
announced in Graver Tank (i.e., whether the device "performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result").152 According to
the court, "any patent is entitled to some range of equivalents" and the test for
amended claim language was whether the scope would "produce substantially the
same result by substantially the same means." 153 The underlying policy for allowing
such amendments to claims was to prevent depriving inventors of protection for
embodiments of their invention "they never meant to put in the public demesne,"
154
despite competing interests, such as intervening rights in the case of reissue.
Therefore, just as in cases, extending as far back as Odiorne,where infringement and
patentability were based on identification of substantial similarity to the "principle"
or "mode of operation" of an invention, 155 in EngineeringDevelopment Laboratories
support for amendment of a claim was determined by identifying substantial
similarity of the amended claim language to embodiments found in the written
description as filed.
151 Id.at 524.
152 Compare Eng. Dev. Labs. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 153 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1946), with Graver
Tank v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
153 Eng. Dev. Labs., 153 F.2d at 524-25. The court wrote:
So far as concerns the change of the anode of the "rectifying" tube, we are
unable to say on this record that it enlarged the scope of the claims at all, if
proper allowance be made for possible equivalents. As we have said, the "grid"
had no function; a "rectifier" which left it out would accomplish the same resultin
substantially the same way; and any patent is entitled to some range of
equivalents.

As to the amendment which substituted "resistance" for "variable
resistance" in the heater circuit, the disclosure was of a "series of resistance" in
that circuit, and the text did not prescribe that any of them should be variable,
but only, as we have said, that "one of these resistances may be a variable
resistance if desired"..... But once more, we cannot know whether a "resistance,"
properly designed for a heater circuit, does not produce substnntially the snme
result by subs tantially the same means as a "variable resistance" so set that it
will prevent the burning out of the filaments. A prioriwe should suppose that it

did.
Id.at 524-25 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
154 Id.at 526. The court further noted:
Nor need we say that, though no excuse is given for the delay [in amending
the claim], the doctrine [of intervening rights] applies if the change is not to a
"new invention" but involves only a minor change necessary to secure complete
protection for what the applicant originally intended to reserve to himself.
Possibly he may have as much in spite of "intervening rights." The doctrine [of
intervening rights] is designed to protect the public against abuses, not to deprive
inventors of what they plainly never meant to put into the public demesne. It is
enough here to say that it certainly does not prevent amendments which go no
further than to make express what would have been regarded as an equivalent of
an original; or to incorporate into one claim what was to be gathered from the
perusal of all, if read together. This is the situation here as it comes to us upon
this record.

Id.
155 See supraPart II.B.2.
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C. Interpretationof 35 U.S. C. § 112, FirstParagraph,Under the PatentAct of 1952

1.

Advent of the Modern Written Description Requirement: cEquivalence," and
"Invention"andcPossession"by the Inventor

Prutton v. Fuller,which was decided after enactment of the Patent Act of 1952,
was an appeal from an interference proceeding wherein entitlement to earlier-filed
applications was determined under a general requirement of "sufficiency of
disclosure." 156 Specifically, the question was whether earlier-filed applications would
"fairly suggest" a claimed composition to one skilled in the art. 157 The court stated
that broad disclosure by an applicant does not necessarily entitle him to claim any
specific combination of disclosed elements:
It is clear, however, that when an applicant cites two or more lists of
ingredients and indicates that any one in one list may be combined with
any one in another, he is not necessarily entitled to claim any specific
combination of elements which may fall within the scope of such a
disclosure, and we have so held. As was said in the decision of the board
affirmed in the Prutton case, "The statutes require more than a statement
of a broad field to be usurped to support claims to a composition of
158
matter."
In In re Gay, Judge Rich, for the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, reversed
a decision by the Patent Office Board of Appeals ("Board").159 The Board had rejected
claims as being based on "new matter" because the phrase "substantially nonporous"
was added to the specification and the claims after filing 160 and because applicants
failed to disclose the "best mode" required under 35 U.S.C. § 112.161 The court stated
that, because "appellants' specification would have indicated to one skilled in the art
that all suggested container materials were to be substantially nonporous . . .
insertion of this
limitation expressly into the specification and claims did not involve
,new matter."'1 62 The court also found that appellants met the requirement of
1 63
disclosing the "best mode" of the invention.
The court stated that the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, although including
several requirements, has two distinct parts:

156 Prutton v. Fuller, 230 F.2d 459, 463 (C.C.P.A. 1956) ("The issue thus presented by this
appeal is limited to the sufficiency of the disclosure of the earlier Prutton applications.").
157 Id. at 463 ("The determining factor is whether the application would fairly suggest to the
skilled worker in the art the particular composition claimed, or whether the desirability of that
composition could be ascertained only by extensive experimentation.").
158 Id. (citations omitted).
159 In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
1c,0Id. at 770.
161 Id. at 772.
162 Id. at 771.
103 Id.
at 774 ("I]t is manifest that appellant does not consider either perforation size,

positioning, or number to be particularly crucial aspects of his invention, and that this fact would be
appreciated by one skilled in the art who read the specification.").
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We have set forth the Patent Office position in some detail as we feel
that it confuses, and in fact is in part contrary to, two of the several
requirements of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. This paragraph
reads as follows:
"[A] The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it it [sic] most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall
"[B] set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
164
out his invention."
The court then stated, with respect to the first part, [A], of the first paragraph that,
in essence, the statute requires that a specification enable one skilled in the art to
make and use the invention: "The essence of portion [A] is that a specification shall
disclose an invention in such a manner as will enable one skilled in the art to make
and utilize it."165
The court also commented on 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(b), with which both the patent
examiner and the Board stated that the specification failed to comply. 37 C.F.R. §
1.71(b) read at the time of Gay, as it does now, as follows:
The specification must set forth the precise invention for which a
patent is solicited, in such manner as to distinguish it from other inventions
and from what is old. It must describe completely a specific embodiment of
the process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or improvement
invented, and must explain the mode of operation or principle whenever
applicable. The best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
166
invention must be set forth.
The court distinguished the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(b) from the
statutory requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, as follows:
One final point remains to be discussed-the Patent Office requirement
based on Rule 71(b) that a "specific embodiment" of appellant's invention be
described in the specification. No direct statutory basis exists for this
requirement other than portion [A] of section 112, which it appears to
implement .... The word "specific" is a somewhat indefinite term in that it
involves a matter of degree-the question, How specific?, is not answered.
Obviously, it is not necessary that an application be more specific than is
requiredby section 112, portion [A]. Not every last detail is to be described,

104

Id. at 772.

Id.

1605

16637 C.F.R. § 1.71(b) (2004) (emphasis added).
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else patent specifications would turn into production specifications, which
1 67
they were never intended to be.
The court held, with respect to the claimed device:
[Tihe disclosure in the specification is such that undue experimentation
would not be necessary for one skilled in the art and that this disclosure
would be sufficient to enable him to make and use the instant invention;
and . . . that in the instant case appellant's disclosure in his specification,
taken with his disclosure in the drawing, amounts to a disclosure of a
1 68
specific embodiment of his invention.
Therefore, just as the court in Engineering Development Laboratories relied on
equivalence to embodiments identified in a specification to support amended claim
language, 169 the court in Gay found that description of a "mode of operation or
principle" of a specific embodiment in the patent disclosure supported enablement of
claimed subject matter.
In In re Rainer, the court held that claims directed to a process for cross-linking
polyethylene were not entitled to the filing date of an earlier-filed application. Like
Prutton, the basis for the court's holding was that, although all of the materials
recited in the claims were listed in the earlier-filed application, there was no
disclosure in the earlier specification to guide selection of those materials and
thereby arrive at the claimed invention. 170 The court in Rainer distinguished the
requirement of Rule 71[b] that the specification "set forth the precise invention" from
the literal language of 35 U.S.C. § 112:
Where, however, the process claims are directed to the use of specific
materials in the process and the specification discloses nothing to guide
such a person in making the selection of such specific materials from the
rather extensive catalog of materials recited, we think the spirit if not the
actual provisions of section 112 are not met. Certainly, the specification
here does not "set forth the precise invention for which a patentis solicited,"
as requiredby Rule 71[lb.171
Therefore, whereas the court in Gay considered Rule 71[b] not to exceed the literal
requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, of enabling the claimed
invention, the court in Rainer suggested that the literal language of Rule 71[b],
107 Gay, 309 F.2d at 774 (emphasis
168Id.
1 9 See supraPart II.B.2.

added).

170 In re Rainer, 347 F.2d 574, 577 (C.C.P.A. 1965). The court stated that:
True, one may, by blind, unguided selection of the claimed materials from the
some 53 listed materials, ultimately arrive at the claimed invention, but there is
nothing disclosed in the specification by which the skilled person in this art will
be guided in making these particular selections in his efforts to practice the
invention.

Id.
171 Id. (emphasis added).
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requiring the specification to "set forth the precise invention," may exceed the literal
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re RuSehig 7 2 affirmed a decision
by the Board rejecting a claim (claim 13) directed to a specific compound,
N-(p-chlorobenzenesulfonyl)-N'-propylurea. 1 7 3 Claim 13 originally was suggested by
a patent examiner for the purpose of an interference proceeding that later was
dissolved by the examiner on his own motion. 174
In the interim, divisional
applications were filed by the parties to the interference that included, in one of the
divisional applications, claims 3 and 7, specifying the same compound as that in
claim 13 of the earlier-filed application.17 5
Patentability of the subject matter of
claims 3 and 7 in the divisional application was contingent upon successful reliance
on the earlier filing date. 1' 6 The Board held that the claims in the divisional
application were not patentable because the specified compound was not disclosed in
177
the patent application.
On appeal, the court stated the issue to be as follows:
The sole issue on this appeal is whether claim 13 [of the parent
application] is supported by the disclosure of appellants' application, a
question which had not been raised in this case at the time of the prior
appeal [reversing a rejection of twelve claims of the same application based

on prior art].178
The court held that the parent application did not explicitly disclose the claimed
compound, nor did it provide sufficient guidance to lead one skilled in the art to the
claimed compound.17 9 Specifically, as stated by the court:
But looking at the problem, as we must, from the standpoint of one with no
foreknowledge of the specific compound, it is our considered opinion that the
board was correct in saying:
Not having been specifically named or mentioned in any manner,
one is left to selection from the myriads of possibilities
encompassed by the broad disclosure, with no guide indicating or
directing that this particular selection should be made rather than
18 0
any of the many others which could also be made.
Appellants argued that the written description of the class of compounds that
embraced the specific compound of claim 13 was sufficient because it would enable

'HI

In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
Id. at 991.
Id.

175

Id.

172
173

176 Id.

179

Id.
Id.
Id. at 995.

180

Id.

177
178
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one skilled in the art to make the claimed compound.181 The court argued, in
response, that the question was not whether one motivated to make the specific
compound would be enabled by the specification to do so, but whether appellants had,
in fact, invented the specific compound claimed:
We find the argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it presumes
some motivation for wanting to make the compound in preference to others.
While we have no doubt a person so motivated would be enabled by the
specification to make it, this is beside the point for the question is not
whether he would be so enabled but whether the specification discloses the
compound to him, specifically, as something appellants actually invented.
1 2
We think it does not. 8
The basis for stating that the compound of claim 13 was not "something
appellants actually invented" was the court's finding that the specification failed to
provide sufficient description to enable one skilled in the art to select the compound
from the "myriads" of possibilities of the broad disclosure.183 The court stated, in
other words, that identification of each of the variables from which selection is to be
made is not sufficient, without guidance, to support any particular combination of
those variables:
It is an old custom in the woods to mark trails by making blaze marks on
the trees. It is no help in finding a trail or in finding one's way through the
woods where the trails have disappeared-or have not yet been made,
which is more like the case here-to be confronted simply by a large number
of unmarked trees. Appellants are pointing to trees. We are looking for
18 4
blaze marks which single out particular trees. We see none.
Although the specification disclosed a class that included the specific compound,
the court found that there was insufficient guidance in the specification to lead one
skilled in the art from the class to the specific compound claimed. Therefore, the
"invention" found lacking by the court was not an invention that the broad disclosure
failed to embrace, but, instead, a selection not conveyed to one skilled in the art. As
stated by the court:
Second, we doubt that the rejection is truly based on section 112, at least on
the parts relied on by appellants. If based on section 112, it is on the
requirement thereof that "The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention * * ." We have a specification which describes
appellants' invention. The issue here is in no wise a question of its
compliance with § 112, it is a question of fact: Is the compound of claim 13
described therein? Does the specification convey clearly to those skilled in
the art, to whom it is addressed, in any way, the information that
181

Id.

182

Id.
Id.

183

184 Id. at 994-95.
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appellants invented that specific compound?
Having considered the
specification in the light that has been shed on it by all the arguments pro
and con, we conclude that it does not.185
The court in Rusch4, therefore, resolved the discrepancy between Gay and Rainerby
holding that a specification lacking adequate guidance to convey to those skilled in
the art that "appellants invented" the claimed invention did not provide a "written
description of the invention," as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112.
After Rusehig, a distinction between an "enablement requirement" and a
"description requirement" within the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was explicitly
recognized. For example, as stated in In re Dileone, the court stated how the
"enablement" requirement might be met without satisfying the "written description
requirement":
For greater clarity on this point, consider the case where the
specification discussed only compound A and contains no broadening
language of any kind. This might very well enable one skilled in the art to
make and use compounds B and C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C
has not been described. The first paragraph of § 112 requires both
description and enablement. 186
In In re Smythe, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals characterized a
Board decision as being "narrowed" to a "description requirement" of the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.187 The court relied on Ruschigto pose the issue to be
decided as whether the appellants "invented" the claimed subject matter.188 The
court found that, although the specification and original claims taught that the
"segmentizing medium" is "air or other gas which is inert to the liquid," it would
"naturally occur" to one skilled in the art to employ an "inert fluid," as later claimed,
regardless of whether the fluid was a liquid or a gas.18 9 Upon the facts of the case,

185 _d.

186
In re Dileone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
187 In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The court reasoned that:
The solicitor states that the "Board's rationale makes it clear that it
regarded 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1 as the proper statutory basis of its
rejection," and particularly argues that appellants fail to describe their invention
2
in their specification.
2. The board may have also treated the rejection of these claims under § 112
under the "enablement" section of the first paragraph, but the solicitor has
narrowed the rejection by his argument to the "description" requirement.
Id.
188 Id. The court further noted:
The question which must be answered is whether the application originally filed
in the Patent Office clearly conveyed in any way to those skilled in the art, to
whom it is addressed, the information that appellants invented the analysis
system with an inert fluid as the segmentizing medium. If it did, then appellants
have made a written description of their invention within the meaning of the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
d. (citations omitted).
189Id. at 1383. The court held that:
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the court concluded that "applicants invented a sample analyzer with an inert fluid
190
segmentizing medium.'
The court in Smythe distinguished the patent application from cases where one
skilled in the art would not necessarily predict performance of a general class in view
of selected species or subcombinations disclosed; where there is such
unpredictability, one skilled in the art would not have been "found to have been
placed in possession of a genus." 191 The alternative to permitting introduction of
broad language "that would naturally occur to one skilled in the art," according to the
court, would cause an extreme burden on applicants and the public:
The alternative places upon patent applicants, the Patent Office, and the
public the undue burden of listing, in the case of applicants, reading and
examining, in the case of the Patent Office, and printing and storing, in the
case of the public, descriptions of the very many structural or functional
equivalents of disclosed elements or steps which are already stored in the
minds of those skilled in the arts, ready for instant recall upon reading the
192
descriptions of specific elements or steps.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Wertheim, stated that "[t]he
function of the description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession,
as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later
claimed by him.
...193 Thereafter, "possession by the inventor" was invoked as the
threshold in several cases decided under the "written description requirement." For
example, the court in In re Blaserrelied on Wertheim to state that the function of the
written description requirement is to "ensure that the applicant had possession, as of
the filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed
by him."

19 4

We believe that the use of an inert fluid broadly in this invention would
naturally occur to one skilled in the art reading the description of the use of air or
other gas as a segmentizing medium to separate the liquid samples. While fluid
is a broader term, encompassing liquids, as noted by the solicitor, the specification
clearly conveys to one skilled in the art that in this invention the characteristics
of a fluid are what make the segmentizing medium work in this invention.

Id.
190 Id. at 1384 ("Likewise, we find in the facts here a description of the use and function of the
segmentizing medium which would convey to one skilled in the sample-analysis art the knowledge
that applicants invented a sample analyzer with an inert fluid segmentizing medium.").
191Id. at 1383. The court stated:
This is not a case where there is any unpredictability such that appellants'
description of air or other inert gas would not convey to one skilled in the art
knowledge that appellants invented an analysis system with the fluid
segmentizing medium. In other cases, particularly but not necessarily, chemical
cases, where there is unpredictability in the performance of certain species or
subcombinations other than those specifically enumerated, one skilled in the art
may be found not to have been placed in possession of a genus or combination
claimed at a later date in the prosecution of a patent application.
Id. (citations omitted).
192 Id. at 1384.
193 In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
194 In re Blaser, 556 F.2d 534, 537 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (citations omitted).
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Similarly, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Driscoll heard an
appeal by appellants from a decision by the Board that a claim directed to a chemical
compound was not supported in "full, clear, and exact terms," as is required by the
first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.195 The question was whether the appealed claim
was entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, thereby antedating an
intervening prior art reference. 196 The earlier application included a "Markush
group" of fourteen constituents, one of which was the support required to entitle the
appellant to the earlier filing date. 197 The court held that one skilled in the art would
recognize that, as of the earlier filing date, appellant had "possession" of the
invention claimed because "one skilled in the art would recognize it as such from the
earlier filed application." 198 The Driscollcourt based public policy for the holding on
a quotation from EngineeringDevelopment Laboratoriesv. Radio Corp. of America,
in which the court employed equivalence as the test for support of claim language:
"If, when [applicants] yield any part of what they originally believed to
be their due, they substitute a new 'invention,' only two courses will be open
to them: they must at the outset either prophetically divine what the art
contains, or they must lay down a barrage of claims, starting with the
widest and proceeding by the successive incorporation of more and more
detail, until all combinations have been exhausted which can by any
possibility succeed. The first is an impossible task; the second is a custom
already more honored in the breach than in the observance, and its
extension would only increase that surfeit of verbiage which has for long
been the curse of patent practice, and has done much to discredit it. It is
impossible to imagine anypublicpurpose which it could serve." 199
In Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar,the CAFC addressed whether a claim to priority
under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to an earlier design application should have been denied
195 In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
196 Id. at 1248.
197

[d. at 1249. The court noted:
We thus agree with appellant that a skilled artisan would recognize from
the disclosure of S.N. 782,756 fourteen distinct classes of compounds ....
This
being the case, it follows that S.N. 782,756 describes the subject matter of claim
13 inasmuch as one of the fourteen classes of compounds is the 5-alkyl
sulfonyl- 1,3,4-thiadiazole ureas defined therein.

d.
198

Id. at 1248-49. The court stated that:
In resolving this issue, we must view the disclosure of the earlier filed
application as would a person skilled in the art and determine whether it
reasonably conveys the information that as of the filing date thereof appellanthad
possession of the class of 5-alkylsulfonyl-1,3,4-thiadiazole ureas defined in claim
13. We are satisliedthat it does.

[W]e believe that, in reality, the exemplified structural formula constitutes the
essence of appellant's invention and that one skilled in the art would recognize it
as such from the earlier filed application.
d. (emphasis added).
199 Dris ol, 562 F.2d at 1250 (quoting Eng. Dev. Labs. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 153 F.2d 523,
526-27 (2d Cir. 1946)).
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because the drawings did not provide an adequate "written description" of the
claimed invention as required by the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.200 The court
recounted a history of the written description requirement that began by reciting the
third section of the Patent Act of 1793, stating that the patent applicant must
"deliver a written description of his invention ...."201 Objects that were set forth in
Evans under the Patent Act of 1793 were, according to the Vas-Cath court, a
"historical" explanation for "written description" and "definiteness" requirements
under the first and second paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 112, respectively. 20 2 The court
then recited a "second, policy-based rationale for the inclusion in section 112 of both
the first paragraph 'written description' and the second paragraph 'definiteness'
requirement ... :"5203
"[Tihere is a subtle relationship between the policies underlying the
description and definiteness requirements, as the two standards, while
complementary, approach a similar problem from different directions.
Adequate description of the invention guards against the inventor's
overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that
his future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his original
creation. The definiteness requirement shapes the future conduct of
persons other than the inventor, by insisting that they receive notice of the
20
scope of the patented device."

4

As discussed, the court in Evans required a specification to provide a description
that would prevent the inventor from "practicing upon the credulity or the fears of
other persons, by pretending that his invention is more than what it really is ....
The basis for the concern at that time was whether an inventor, who had improved
upon the prior art, was entitled to a patent on the improved device as a whole, or only
on the portion of the device that represented the improvement. 20 6 Further, even at
the time of Evans, the principle of an invention could embrace later improvements,
as set forth in Section 2 of the Patent Act of 1793, separately from the "written
description" requirement of Section 3 of that Act. 20 7

The court in

acknowledged that preventing an inventor from overreaching

Vas-Cath

was a "second,

VasCath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id.at 1561 (quoting Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 430 (1822)).
202 VasCath, 935 F.2d at 1560-61.
203 Id. at 1561.
204 Id. (quoting Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1981, cert. denied, 102
S.Ct. 600 (1981)).
205 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822).
206Id.at 434-35. The court reasoned that:
The specification must describe the invention "insuch full, clear, and distinct
terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known." How can
that be a sufficient specification of an improvement in the machine, which does
not distinguish what the improvement is, nor state in what it consists, nor for how
far the invention extends? .. .we do not say that the party is bound to describe
the old machine, but we are of opinion that he ought to describe what his own
improvement is, and to limit his patent to such improvement.
Id.
207 See supraPart II.B.1.
200

201
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policy-based rationale," distinct from the object of Evans, of "taking from the inventor
the means of practicing upon the credulity or fears of other persons by pretending
that his invention is more than it really is ......
208
Therefore, the "second,
policy-based rationale," requiring a written description of the invention to prevent an
inventor from "overreaching" by requiring that "he recount his invention in such
detail that his future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his original
creation," 20 9 was new; it did not originate in the Patent Act of 1793, at least in view of
the objects of the Act as explained in Evans and recited in Vas-Cath.
In Lockwood v. American Airlines, the CAFC affirmed a district court decision
that two of three intervening applications failed to maintain continuity of disclosure,
thereby denying entitlement to a necessary earlier filing date. 210 Judge Lourie stated
that entitlement to a filing date "does not extend to subject matter which is not
disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed." 211 The court stated
that a demonstration that one is "in possession" of the invention is satisfied by
providing a description of the invention, not that which would make the invention
obvious,

212

and that a written description demonstrates possession of the invention

by "words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the
213
claimed invention."
The court then went on to state that, although the invention need not be
described in exact terms, the description must be equivalent to the claimed subject
matter: "[Ailthough the exact terms need not be used in haec verba . . . the
specification must contain an equivalent description of the claimed subject matter. A
description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is
214
sought is not sufficient."
Therefore, as in EngineeringDevelopment Laboratories,215 which was decided in
1946, prior to the Patent Act of 1952, adequate support in Lockwood was a literal
description in a specification equivalent to claimed subject matter. Further, as was
also true in earlier cases, the court in Lockwood held that speculation "as to
modifications that the inventor might have envisioned" was not enough; the
invention must be described:
It is not sufficient for purposes of the written description requirement of §
112 that the disclosure, when combined with the knowledge in the art,
208 VasCath, 935 F.2d at 1561.
209 Id.

Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, 107 F.3d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id.at 1571-72.
212 Id.at 1572. The court stated:
The question is not whether a claimed invention is an obvious variant of that
which is disclosed in a specification. Rather, a prior application itself must
describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can
clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing
date sought . . . . One shows that one is 'inpossession' of the invention by
describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it
obvious.
Id. (citations omitted).
213 Id.
214 Id. (citations omitted).
215 Eng. Dev. Labs. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 153 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1946).
210
211
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would lead one to speculate as to modifications that the inventor might
have envisioned, but failed to disclose. Each application in the chain must
216
describe the claimed features.
In summary, under Lockwood and its legal precedents, an adequate written
description must enable one skilled in the art to understand, from the literal teaching
or its equivalent, the scope of the claimed invention.

2. Development of the Written DescriptionRequirement as Applied to Biotechnology
In In re Fisher,the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed a rejection by
the Board for insufficient disclosure under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. 217
The court held that, despite failure to provide a structural description of porcine
adrenocorticotrophic hormones ("ACTH"), porcine (hog)-extracts disclosed in the
parent application provided adequate support under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 for rejected claim 4218 because they inherently included the sequence recited in
the claim.

219

On the other hand, the court held that the claimed hormone, which was

not limited to that of any particular animal, could not be broadened beyond the
thirty-nine amino acid sequence of hog-pituitary extracts because there was no
demonstration that the structure of ACTH's of other animals would be the same and
the specification would not enable one skilled in the art to "make or obtain" ACTHs

216

217

Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572.
In -reFisher, 427 F.2d 833, 840 (C.C.P.A. 1970).

Id. at 837. As recited in Fis-her, Claim 4 reads as follows:
4. An adrenocorticotrophic hormone preparation containing at least 1
International Unit of ACTH per milligram and containing no more than 0.08 units
of vasopressin and no more than 0.05 units of oxytocin per International Unit of
ACTH, and being further characterized as containing as the active component of
[a?] polypeptide of at least 24 amino acids having the following sequence from the
N terminus of the molecule: Serine, Tyrosine, Serine, Methionine, Glutanmie Acid,
Histadine, Phenylalanine, Arginine, Tryptophan, Glycine, Lysine, Proline, Valine,
Glycine, Lysine, Lysine, Arginine, Arginine, Proline, Valine, Lysine, Valine,
Tryrosine, Proline.
Id. at 835.
219 Id. at 836. The court set out that:
The examiner took the position that . . . the parent contained insufficient
disclosure to support claim 4 in the manner required by the first paragraph of 35
U.S.C. § 112. The board affirmed this rejection for two reasons. First, since the
parent application lacked any structural description of the ACTH extracts therein
disclosed, the Board concluded that it could not be determined whether those
products would meet the terms of claim 4, which recites a specific sequence of the
first 24 amino acids. Appellant contended that the parent application inherently
disclosed products meeting the terms of claim 4, even though appellant did not
know the chemical structure of those products when the parent application was
filed. Appellant cited several cases in support of the proposition that inherent
disclosure is sufficient under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ....
We agree with appellant that
this finding was erroneous . . . . The hog-extracted products disclosed in
appellant's parent application must therefore have had the recited sequence.
218
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having other amino acid sequences. 220 Therefore, in view of Fisher,a specification
meets the requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, and there is no need
to provide literal support for a claimed sequence of amino acids where the sequence is
inherent in a product otherwise adequately described. Further, a finding that a
specification fails to support a claim beyond the literal or inherent description within
the specification may be based on lack of enablement of one skilled in the art to
"make or obtain" the product as broadly claimed.
The CAFC in Amgen v. Chugai PharmaceuticalCo. held that a generic claim,
covering all possible DNA sequences that will encode any polypeptide having an
amino acid sequence "'sufficiently duplicative' of [erythropoietin (EPO)] to possess the
property of increasing production of red blood cells," was invalid under the
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.221 The court approved of reliance by the
district court on the portion of the decision in Fisherholding that a claim directed to
a polypeptide having at least twenty-four amino acids of a sequence, without more,
was inadequately supported under the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 by
222
a specification that disclosed only a thirty-nine amino acid product.
With respect to the EPO gene, the CAFC in Amgen stated that the disclosure in
Amgen's patent was not sufficient to enable the scope of DNA sequences claimed:
Moreover, it is not necessary that a patent applicant test all the
embodiments of his invention . .

.;

what is necessary is that he provide a

disclosure sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to carry out the
invention commensurate with the scope of his claims. For DNA sequences,
that means disclosing how to make and use enough sequences to justify
grant of the claims sought.

Amgen has not done that here ....

What is

relevant depends on the facts, and the facts here are that Amgen has not
220

Id. The court set out that:
The board's second reason for holding the parent application insufficient to
support claim 4 was that the products disclosed in the parent were insufficient to
support a claim of the breadth of claim 4. On this point we agree with the board.
•. . We do not know, from the record, the chemical structure of ACTHs of whales
or other animals. Appellants' parent application, therefore, discloses no products,
inherently or expressly, containing other than 39 amino acids, yet the claim
includes all polypeptides, of the recited potency and purity, having at least 24
amino acids in the chain in the recited sequence. The parent specification does
not enable one skilled in the art to make or obtain ACTHs with other than 39

amino acids in the chain, and there has been no showing that one of ordinary skill
would have known how to make or obtain such other ACTHs without undue
experimentation

. . . .

In

the latter situation, the statement is

"enabling" and hence lends no further support for the broad claim.
Id.

in

no way

221 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
222 Id. at 1214. The court found that:

The district court properly relied on Fisherin making its decision. In that
case, an applicant was attempting to claim an adrenocorticotrophic hormone
preparation containing a polypeptide having at least twenty-four amino acids of a

specified sequence. Only a thirty-nine amino acid product was disclosed. The
court found that applicant could not obtain claims that are insufficiently
supported and hence not in compliance with the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §

112.

[4:406 2005]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

enabled the preparation of DNA sequences to support its all-encompassing
claims.

It is not sufficient having made the gene and a handful of analogues whose
activity has not been clearly ascertained, to claim all possible genetic
sequences that have EPO-like activity. Under the circumstances, we find
no error in the court's conclusion that the generic DNA sequence claims are
invalid under Section 112.223
The court in Amgen, therefore, found that claims directed to DNA sequences were
invalid for failure to meet the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The court also held that, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g),224 conception of a gene, in the
absence of a written description that is sufficient to distinguish it from other
materials and a method to obtain it, does not occur until reduction to practice and
that reduction to practice is defined as isolation of the gene:
Conception does not occur unless one has a mental picture of the structure
of the chemical, or is able to define it by its method of preparation, its
physical or chemical properties, or whatever characteristics sufficiently
distinguish it. It is not sufficient to define it solely by its principal
biological property, e.g., encoding human erythropoietin, because an alleged
conception having no more specificity than that is simply a wish to know
the identity of any material with that biological property. We hold that
when an inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of a gene so
as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method of obtaining it,
conception has not been achieved until reduction to practice has occurred,
i.e., until after the gene has been isolated.225
Therefore, the court in Amgen did not require a written description that listed all
nucleic acid sequences to demonstrate conception of the invention under 35 U.S.C. §
102(g). Rather, as in Fisher with respect to providing sufficient disclosure of a
claimed polypeptide under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, only isolation of the
claimed product was required in the absence of an explicit claimed structure.
Fiers v. Revel was an appeal from a decision by the Board in a three-way
interference between parties Fiers, Revel and Sugano. 226 The party Fiers argued
223

Id. (citations omitted).

224 In

analyzing the point, the court noted that under § 102(g):
A person is entitled to a patent unless-(g) before the applicant's invention
thereof the invention was made . . . by another who had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of
the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive
and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
Id. at 1205.
225 Id. at 1206 (emphasis added).
226

984 F.2d 1164, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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that an enabling method for obtaining a DNA sequence was essentially the same as
proving conception of the DNA. 22 7 The court explained, in response to Fiers'
argument, that a method of preparation may be employed as support for conception
of a DNA sequence when the DNA is claimed by the method, i.e., as a
product-by-process claim:
Our statement in Amgen that conception may occur, inter alia, when one is
able to define a chemical by its method of preparation requires that the
DNA be claimed by its method of preparation. We recognized that, in
addition to being claimable by structure or physical properties, a chemical
material can be claimed by means of a process. A product-by-process claim
normally is an after-the-fact definition, used after one has obtained a
material by a particular process. Before reduction to practice, conception
only of a process for making a substance, without a conception of a
structural or equivalent definition of that substance, can at most constitute
a conception of the substance claimed as a process.

228

The court's reasoning in Fiersarguably extends beyond that of Amgen in that, in
Amgen, the229method provided for obtaining the EPO gene was characterized as
"uncertain."
In contrast to Amgen, there was evidence in the form of affidavits
that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to isolate B-IF DNA based
on the protocol proposed by Fierq without undue experimentation. 230 The court in
Fiers, however, partitioned conception of DNA from any question of enablement
related to its isolation, regardless of certainty: "Fiers has devoted a considerable
portion of his briefs to arguing that his method was enabling. The issue here,
however, is conception of the DNA of the count, not enablement. Enablement
concerns teaching one of ordinary skill in the art how to practice the claimed
invention." 23 1 With respect to Fiers' argument for priority of invention, the court

227

Id. at 1168. The court stated that:

[Appellant] Fiers suggests that the standard for proving conception of a DNA by
its method of preparation is essentially the same as that for proving that the

method is enabling. Fiers thus urges us to conclude that since his method was
enabling for the DNA of the count, he conceived it in the United States when
Gilbert and Sharp entered the country with the knowledge of, and detailed notes
concerning, Fiers' process for obtaining it.
Id.
228

Id. at 1169.

229

Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1207. The Amgen court stated:
As expert testimony from both sides indicated, success in cloning the EPO gene
was not assured until the gene was in fact isolated and its sequence known.
Based on the uncertainties of the method and lack of information concerning the
amino acid sequence of the EPO protein, the trial court was correct in concluding
that neither party had an adequate conception of the DNA sequence until
reduction to practice had been achieved ....

Id.
230 Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1168 ("Specifically, the Board determined that Fiers' disclosure of a
method for isolating the DNA of the count, along with expert testimony that his method would have
enabled one of ordinary skill in the art to produce that DNA .
.
231 Id. at 1169.
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stated that, when a substance was claimed "perse," conception required a "structure,
name, formula, or definitive chemical or physical properties."232
The CAFC also denied entitlement to an earlier-filed Israeli application to Revel,
who was the second party in the three-way interference of Fier.2 3 3 The court stated
that Revel's method was not proven to be enabling 234 and that for Revel to claim
priority to an earlier filing date, the earlier application needed to have described the
DNA "itself."235 The court succinctly stated the Board's conclusion as follows:
"Relying on Amgen, the Board concluded that the Israeli application was not
enabling since Revel had not conceived the DNA of the count and '[logically, one
cannot . . . enable an invention that has not been conceived."' 23 6 The court then
paraphrased its explanation in Amgen, stating that a method for obtaining claimed
DNA, without more, is inadequate as a conception of the DNA and, therefore,
enablement need not be considered:
As we stated in Amgen and reaffirmed above, such a disclosure just
represents a wish, or arguably a plan, for obtaining the DNA. If a
conception of a DNA requires a precise definition, such as by structure,
formula, chemical name, or physical properties, as we have held, then a
description also requires that degree of specificity. To paraphrase the
237
Board, one cannot describe what one has not conceived.
Revel asserted that, "since the language of the count refers to a DNA and not to
a specific sequence, the specification need not describe the sequence of the DNA in
order to satisfy the written description requirement." 238 The court disagreed and
affirmed the Board's reasoning that, although "what is needed to meet the
description requirement will necessarily vary depending on the nature of the
invention claimed," there must be a demonstration to one skilled in the art that the
inventor had possession of the claimed invention.23 9 The court found that a count, or
claim, that covers all DNAs that code for a specific protein is analogous to a single
means claim and, therefore, does not comply with the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §
112:
Because the count at issue purports to cover all DNAs that code for
6-IF, it is also analogous to a single means claim, which has been held not to
232 Id. ("Conception of a substance claimed per se without reference to a process requires
conception of its structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or physical properties.").
233

Id.at 1171.

Id.("Revel's application does not even demonstrate that the disclosed method actually leads
to the DNA, and thus that he had possession of the invention, since it only discloses a clone that
might be used to obtain mRNA coding for B-IF.").
235 Id. at 1170-71 ("An adequate written description of DNA requires more than a mere
statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is
required is a description of the DNA itself. Revel's specification does not do that.").
236 Id.at 1170.
237 Id. at 1171.
238 Id.at 1170.
231)Id. ("On reconsideration, the Board correctly set forth the legal standard for sufficiency of
234

description: the specification of Revel's Israeli application must reasonably convey []to the artisan
that the inventor had possession at the time of the ... claimed subject matter." (citations omitted)).
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comply with the first paragraph of § 112 .... Claiming all DNA's [sic] that

achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance
with the description requirement; it is an attempt to pre-empt the future
240
before it has arrived.
24 1
The court declined to decide whether Revel's prior application was enabling.
The third party, Sugano, won the interference. 242 Sugano was the first to not
only describe a method for obtaining a DNA that coded for B-1F, but to provide a
complete and correct nucleotide sequence, thereby meeting the enablement and
written description requirements, respectively. 243
Therefore, the courts in both Amgen and Fiers required actual reduction to
practice in order to demonstrate conception. However, in both cases, the requirement
for actual reduction to practice rested on lack of certainty of enablement of the
disclosed method. 244 In Amgen, certainty would be established by isolation of the
gene. 245 In Fiers,the court, in explaining Amgen, also appeared to rely on certainty
and, thus, enablement, to demonstrate conception by stating that, "[b]efore reduction
to practice, conception only of a process for making a substance, without a conception
of a structural or equivalent definition of that substance, can at most constitute a

conception of the substance claimed as a process."

246

In other words, the court

implied that conception of a claimed substance would hinge on the success of the
process described for obtaining it. Therefore, despite the statement in Fiers
specifically partitioning sufficiency of a written description (to demonstrate
conception) from enablement, the court, by relying on actual reduction to practice,
was consistent with the court in Amgen, which found actual reduction to practice and
24 7
inherency to be a substitute for physical description of a composition, such as DNA.
The CAFC in The Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.
held that claims directed to cDNA sequences other than those found in rats were
240
211

Id. at 1171.
Id.at 1171 n.12 ("In light of our disposition of the written description question, we do not

address whether Revel's Israeli application satisfies the enablement requirement.").
242 fId.
at 1172.
213 Id.The court stated:
We conclude that Sugano is entitled to rely on his disclosure as enabling
since it sets forth a detailed teaching of a method for obtaining a DNA coding for
6-IF . . . . We also conclude that Sugano's application satisfies the written
description requirement since it sets forth the complete and correct nucleotide
sequence of a DNA coding for 6-IF and thus "convey[s] with reasonable clarity to
those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, [Sugano] was in
possession of the [DNA coding for B-IF]."
Id. (citations omitted).
244 See generallyAmgen v. Chugai Pharm. Co. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Fiers v. Revel,

984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
24 5

Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206. The court held:
We hold that when an inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of a
gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method for obtaining
it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to practice has occurred, i.e.,
until after the gene has been isolated.

Id.
246
247

Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169.
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
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invalid for failure to comply with the written description requirement of the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.248 However, with respect to each of the claims, the
analysis employed by the court included considerations of enablement. 249 For
example, U.S. Patent No. 4,652,525 ("the '525 patent"), one of two patents at issue,250
included a claim (claim 5) directed to human insulin cDNA. 25 1 A constructive
example (Example 6) of the specification of the '525 patent provided a general
method for obtaining human cDNA, which was actually employed to isolate rat
252
cDNA, and provided the amino acid sequences of human insulin A and B chains.

The court stated that providing an amino acid sequence is not an adequate
description of a specific cDNA sequence due to redundancy of the genetic code. 253 The

court also stated that, absent the cDNA sequence, a general method (e.g., the method
employed by Example 6) did not meet the written description requirement of the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 in support of a claim directed to human insulin cDNA:
This example [Example 6], however, provides only a general method for
obtaining human cDNA (it incorporates by reference the method used to
obtain the rat cDNA) along with the amino acid sequences of human insulin
A and B chains. Whether or not it provides an enabling disclosure, it does
not provide a written description of the cDNA encoding human insulin,
which is necessary to provide a written description of the subject matter of
claim 5.254
The CAFC held that a "written description of the cDNA encoding human
insulin" was not provided. 255 This holding was premised on the fact that, "whether or
not" the specification was enabling, a "general method" for isolating the human
cDNA and the corresponding human amino acid sequences was insufficient to
248 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
249

Id. at 1567.

250 The other patent at issue was U.S. Patent No. 4,431,740 (issued Feb. 14, 1984).

The claims of the '525 patent are as follows:
1. A recombinant plasmid replicable in procaryotic host containing within its
nucleotide sequence a subsequence having the structure of the reverse transcript
of an mRNA of a vertebrate, which mRNA encodes insulin.
2. A recombinant procaryotic microorganism modified to contain a nucleotide
sequence having the structure of the reverse transcript of an mRNA of a
vertebrate, which mRNA encodes insulin.
3. The bacterium Eseheriehia coli which has been modified to contain a nucleotide
sequence having the structure of and transcribed from the rat gene for insulin.
4. A microorganism according to claim 2 wherein the vertebrate is a mammal.
5. A microorganism according to claim 2 wherein the vertebrate is a human.
6. A plasmid according to claim 1 comprising a plasmid containing at least one
genetic determinant of col E 1.
7. A microorganism according to claim 2 comprising a strain of Eseherichiacoli.
U.S. Patent No. 4,652,525 (issued Mar. 24, 1987).
252 See Regents of The Univ. of Cal., 119 F.3d at 1567 ("The patent describes a method of
obtaining this [human insulin encoding] cDNA by means of a constructive example, Example 6.").
253 Id. ("We had previously held that a claim to a specific DNA is not made obvious by mere
knowledge of a desired protein sequence and methods for generating the DNA that encodes that
protein." (citations omitted)).
251

254 Id.
255Id.
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support the specific claimed subject matter of cDNA encoding those amino acid
sequences. 256 In other words, the written description did not permit one skilled in
the art to comprehend, on the basis of the general teachings, the specific human
cDNA sequences encoding human insulin A and B chains.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7, which were directed generically to cDNA encoding
vertebrate or mammalian cDNA, also were held to be invalid for failure to meet the
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.257 The basis for the court's
opinion was that the specification, which adequately described only one species (rat)
of a genus (vertebrate or mammalian), did not 25meet
the written description
requirement with respect to the generic claims. 8
The CAFC stated that,
nevertheless, a genus of cDNAs could be adequately supported by providing a
"representative number of cDNAs," thereby linking sufficiency of the written
description with enablement:
A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation
of a representative number of cDNAs, defined by nucleotide sequence,
falling within the scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features
common to the members of the genus, which features constitute a
substantial portion of the genus. This is analogous to enablement of the
genus under § 112, 1, by showing the enablement of a representative
259
number of species within the genus.
The clear implication of the court was that the specification might have met the
written description requirement other than by providing nucleotide sequences, even
though, in the case of the '525 patent, the written description requirement had not
been met:
We will not speculate in what other ways a broad genus of genetic material
may be properly described, but it is clear to us, as it was to the district
court, that the claimed genera of vertebrate and mammal cDNA are not
described by the general language of the '525 patent's written description
260
supported only by the specific nucleotide sequence of rat insulin.
Therefore, even in Lilly, despite clear statements that the written description
requirement was distinct from the enablement requirement and that the decision
was based entirely on failure to meet the written description requirement, the court
employed reasoning associated with enablement and did not rule out alternatives to
providing exact claimed structures.
In Enzo Bioehem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe,261 [hereinafter Enzo Ii] the CAFC, on
rehearing, vacated its own prior decision 262 and reversed a district court decision
25 Id.
257 Id.

at 1569.
Id. at 1568 ("We agree with Lilly that the claims are invalid. Contrary to the UC's
argument, a description of rat insulin cDNA is not a description of the broad classes of vertebrate or
mammalian insulin cDNA.").
259Id. at 1569 (citations omitted).
258

20G0
Id.
201 Enzo

Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Enzo I.
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granting summary judgment invalidating claims 1 through 6 of U.S. Patent No.
4,900,659 ("the '659 patent"), for failure to meet the written description requirement
under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The claims at issue were directed to
nucleic acid probes that selectively hybridize to nucleic acid sequences of Neisseria
gonorrhoeae relative to Neisseria meningitidi. 263 Claims 1 through 4 of the '659
patent were directed to compositions and made reference to deposits at the American
Type Culture Collection ("ATCC").264 Claims 5 and 6 were directed to assays for
detection of N. gonorrhoeae using the composition of claim 1 or a variant of that
265
composition.
In vacating their previous decision and reversing the decision of the district
court, the CAFC adopted guidelines issued by the USPTO, which stated, in part, that
a specification can meet the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 by
including a "disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics...
i.e., complete or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical properties,
functional characteristics when coupled with a known or disclosed correlation
266
between function and structure, or some combination of such characteristics."
However, prior to applying the standard adopted from the USPTO's Guidelines, the
court first considered, as an issue of first impression, "[wihether reference to a
deposit of a nucleotide sequence may adequately describe that sequence ....
The
court held that, considering the "history of biological deposits for patent purposes, the
goals of patent law, and the practical difficulties of describing unique biological
materials in a written description,"' 268 reference to a "deposit in a public depository,
which makes its contents accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in
written form," did satisfy the written description requirement under the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.269 The court relied on rules promulgated by the
USPTO stating that a deposit is not necessary when "it is known and readily
270
available to the public or can be made or isolated without undue experimentation,"
to thereby allow deposited claimed subject matter as an alternative where the
invention "cannot reasonably be enabled by a description in written form in the
specification
."271
Further, the court stated that the written description
requirement is met by what a person skilled in the art can obtain from the deposit:
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Enzo 1].
H, 323 F.3d at 960.
961-62.
265 Id. at 962.
266 Id. at 964.
267 Id. at 965 ("Whether reference to a deposit of a nucleotide sequence may adequately
describe that sequence is an issue of first impression in this court.").
262 Enzo

2 3 Enzo
2
64 Id. at

2 8 Id.

1, 323 F.3d at 965. The court held as follows:
[W]e hold that reference in the specification to a deposit in a public depository,
which makes its contents accessible to the public when it is not otherwise
available in written form, constitutes an adequate description of the deposited
material sufficient to comply with the written description requirement of § 112,
1.

206)Enzo

Id.
270
271

Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.802(b) (2001)).
Id. ("Inventions that cannot reasonably be enabled by a description in written form in the

specification, but that otherwise meet the requirements for patent protection, may be described in
surrogate form by a deposit that is incorporated by reference into the specification.").
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A person of skill in the art, reading the accession numbers in the patent
specification, can obtain the claimed sequences from the ATCC depository
by following the appropriate techniques to excise the nucleotide sequences
from the deposited organisms containing those sequences .

.

.

.

The

sequences are thus accessible from the disclosure in the specification ....
We therefore agree with Enzo that reference in the specification to deposits
of nucleotide sequences describe those sequences sufficiently to the public
272
for purposes of meeting the written description requirement.
Even claims 4 and 6 of the '659 patent, which were not limited to the deposited
sequences, but also included "subsequences" (which were defined in the specification
as having "greater than about twelve nucleotides),2 73 did not necessarily fail the
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. According to the court, adequacy
of the written description as applied to claims 4 and 6 was to be determined by
"whether a person of skill in the art would glean from the written description,
including information obtainable from the deposits of the claimed sequences,
subsequences, mutated variants, and mixtures sufficient to demonstrate possession
274
of the generic scope of the claims."

The court concluded with a statement of public policy behind the written
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that is consistent with the historical quid
pro quo of enabling the public to make and use the claimed invention in exchange for
a limited period of exclusivity. 275 As stated by the court in Enzo .
For biological inventions, for which providing a description in written form
is not practicable, one may nevertheless comply with the written description
requirement by publicly depositing the biological material, as we have held
today. That compliance is grounded on the fact of the deposit and the
accession number in the specification, not because a reduction to practice
has occurred. Such description is the quidpro quo of the patent system; the

2

27

273

Id. at 965-66.
Id. at 966. With respect to claims 4 and 6, the court observed that:
Claim 4 is directed to nucleotide sequences that are selected from the group of
three deposited sequences, discrete nucleotide subsequences thereof .... Claim 6
is also similarly directed to three deposited sequences and subsequences .... The
specification defines a subsequence nonspecifically as a nucleotide sequence
"greater than about 12 nucleotides."

Id.
274

Id. Specifically, the court stated:
On the other hand, because the deposited sequences [of claims 4 and 6] are
described by virtue of a reference to their having been deposited, it may well be
that various subsequences, mutations, and mixtures of those sequences are also
described to one of skill in the art ....
On remand, the court should determine
whether a person of skill in the art would glean from the written description,
including information obtainable from the deposits of the claimed sequences,
subsequences,

mutated

variants,

and

mixtures

possession of the generic scope of the claims.
Id.
275

Id. at 970.

sufficient

to

demonstrate
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public must receive meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded
276
from practicingthe invention for a limitedperiod of time.
The order granting the petition for rehearing issued the same day as Enzo Hand
included three concurring and two dissenting opinions. 277 Judge Lourie, who wrote
the majority opinion reversing the decision by the district court, concurred with
Judge Newman in the decision not to rehear the case en banc. 27 8 He stated that the
plain language of the first paragraph set forth both a written description
requirement and an enablement requirement, and he supported this grammatical
interpretation with a historical interpretation of the statute supporting the existence
of a written description requirement prior to imposition of a requirement for claims:
The statute states that the invention must be described. That is basic
patent law, the quidpro quo for the grant of a patent. Judge Rader notes
that historically the written description requirement served a purpose when
claims were not required. While that may be correct, when the statute
began requiring claims, it was not amended to delete the requirement; note
the comma between the description requirement and the enablement
provision, and the "and" that follows the comma. Judge Rich, whom Judge
Rader cites, was in fact one of the earliest interpreters of the statute as
27 9
having separate enablement and written description requirements.

276 Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, the distinction in this passage between reduction to
practice and deposit makes sense only in the context of enablement. As was discussed in Amgen,
reduction to practice was a substitute for providing both a physical description and an enabling
method:
We hold that when an inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of a
gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method of obtaining
it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to practice has occurred; i.e.,
until after the gene has been isolated.
Amgen v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In neither Amgen nor Enzo II
was there a physical description of the product. However, in Amgen, reduction to practice ensured
that the method described was enabling: '[b]efore reduction to practice, conception only of a process
for making a substance, without a conception of a structural or equivalent definition of a substance,
can at most constitute a conception of the substance claimed as a process." Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d
1164, 1165 (C.A.F.C. 1993) (emphasis added). In Enzo II, lack of an enabling description in the
specification was presumed: [i]nventions that cannot be enabled by a description in written form in
the specification, but that otherwise meet requirements for patent protection, may be described in
surrogate form by a deposit that is incorporated by reference into the specification." Enzo 11 323
F.3d at 965. Therefore, while Amgen required reduction to practice to ensure that the method
provided was enabling, in Enzo II a publicly accessible deposit was a substitute for lack of an
enabling written description. It should be noted, however, that the court in Fiers stated that
conception also can occur in the absence of reference to a process:
[c]onception of a substance
claimed per se without reference to a process requires conception of its structure, name, formula, or
definitive chemical or physical properties." Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169.
277 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (non-precedential
opinion) [hereinafter Enzo IhA.
278

Id. at 971.

Id. (Lourie, J., concurring) (citations omitted) As discussed in Part ILA, supra, prior to a
specific requirement that the application particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention,
the relevant patent statute did, in fact, require a written description of the invention, separate and
27)
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Judge Lourie disagreed with Judge Rader who, in a dissenting opinion
(discussed infra), argued that the written description in the first paragraph, until
Enzo /, was limited to establishing priority of invention. 28 0 He also disagreed with
the proposition that claims finding literal support in the specification, by definition,
meet with the written description requirement 28 1 and employed an example set forth
in DiLeone to distinguish enablement from the written description requirement on
the basis that the breadth of enablement of a disclosure may exceed the breadth of
the invention disclosed. 28 2 Moreover, Judge Lourie asserted his belief that an
elevated interest in patent protection and a consequent effort to broaden claim
coverage beyond literal support in a patent application is the impetus behind
renewed focus on the written description requirement:
It is said that applying the written description requirement outside of
the priority context was novel until several years ago. Maybe so, maybe
not; certainly such a holding was not precluded by statute or precedent.
New interpretations of old statutes in light of new fact situations occur all
the time. I believe these issues have arisen in recent years for the same
reason that more doctrine of equivalents issues are in the courts viz.,
because perceptions that patents are stronger tempt patent owners to try to
apart from a requirement that the applicant enable the invention. Upon statutory recognition of
claims in the Patent Act of 1836, the language of the statute was changed so that sufficiency of
written description was "as to" enable one skilled in the art to make and use the invention. With
respect to § 112,
1 of the Patent Act of 1952, Judge Markey provided a grammatical construction
in his dissent in In re Barker, which is different from Judge Lourie's in that it supports the
proposition that enablement is the measure by which satisfaction of the "written description
requirement" is met:
Section 112, first paragraph, is a simple sentence, with a comma after "it," making
the phrase "in such full *** the same" a modifier of both objects of the verb
"contain." All before that comma prescribes what shall be described. The phrase
following the comma prescribes how and for whom it shall be described.
In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 594 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
280 Enzo I1 323 F.3d at 972 (Lourie, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Judge Lourie noted:
Moreover, the dissenters would limit the requirement, to the extent that
they credit the written description portion of the statute as being a separate
requirement at all, to priority issues. The statute does not say "a written
description of the invention for purposes of policing priority."

Id.
281

Id.

In discussing the dissenting opinion, Judge Lourie commented:
I believe that the dissenters miss the point in seeing this case as involving
an original claim or in ipsis verbis issue. There is no question that an original
claim is part of the specification ....
It is incorrect that the mere appearance of
vague claim language in an original claim or as part of the specification
necessarily satisfies the written description requirement or shows possession of a
generic invention.

Id.
282 Id.

at 975. In his concurrence, Judge Lourie noted:
Some commentators have had difficulty in understanding how one may have
enabled an invention, but not described it. The believe they must coincide. As an
example of how the written description and enablement provisions differ in
chemistry, however, one may readily have enabled the making of an invention,
but still not have described it....
Id. (citations omitted).
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assert their patents beyond the original intentions of the inventors and
their attorney. That is why the issues are being raised and that is why we
have to decide them. Claims are now being asserted to cover what was not
283
reasonably described in the patent.
Judge Newman, in a separate concurring opinion, reiterated Judge Lourie's
opinion that the written description requirement has never been limited to
antedating prior art or establishing priority. 28

4

She also stated that deposit of

biological material to meet the written description requirement, was "a special case"
28 5
that does not change the statutory requirement for a written description.
Judge Rader, in his dissent, firmly stated that, until Judge Rich's opinion in
Ruschig, there was no written description requirement apart from enablement, and
that the new "written description" ("WD") doctrine created in Rusehig extended no
further than "policing priority":
In 1967, in In re Rusbehig, this court's predecessor created for the first
time a new WD doctrine to enforce priority. In the context of a new claim
added "[aibout a year after the present application was filed," the Rusehig
court sought to determine "whether [the new] claim 13 is supported by the
disclosure of appellants' application." Rather than use § 132, however,
Rusehigassigned the role of policing priority to § 112 .... To deal with new
matter in the claims, the court calved a new WD doctrine out of the § 112
enablement requirement.

In any event, the WD doctrine, at its inception, had a very clear
28 6
function-preventing new matter from creeping into claim amendments.
Judge Rader then recited language employed by Judge Rich, correlating satisfaction
of the written description requirement with a demonstration in the specification that
the claimed invention was in the possession of the inventor at the time of filing, as
the means for policing priority:
In resolving this question, Judge Rich stated again the purpose of
WD: "The function of the description requirement is to ensure that
283

284

Id. at 971-72.
Id. at 975 (Newman, J., concurring). Judge Newman concurred by stating:
The theory of the dissent that a description of the invention is not needed in order
to support the claims, but serves only to antedate prior art or establish priority in
an interference, is a dramatic innovation in the theory and practice of patents. It
has never been the sole purpose of the description requirement, and negates not
only the logic but the history of patent practice.

Id.
285 Id. ("And the special case of the biological deposit is a method of complying with the
statutory requirements, as the panel now confirms; this expedient implements the statute for the
special subject matter, but does not change it.").
286Enzo I1 323 F.3d at 977-78 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application
relied on, of the specific subject matter laterclaimed by him." In sum,
the WD was a new matter doctrine, a priority policeman. 287
Judge Rader's dissent summarized the written description requirement as "the
equivalent of the statutory new matter doctrine," further stating that the doctrine
"simply has no application to claims without priority problems." 28 8 He presented an
appendix that "will briefly explicate all written description cases from its creation in
1967 in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to the present." 289 Judge Rader
stated that the "appendix shows that only two cases, this ENZO case and the 1997
290
LILLY case have purported to apply the doctrine outside its purpose and function."
According to Judge Rader, the CAFC in Lilly extended the written description
requirement beyond priority to a "free-standing disclosure requirement" substituting
for enablement: "In sum, the Lilly opinion does not test a later claim amendment
against the specification for priority, but asserts a new free-standing disclosure
requirement in place of the statutory standard of enablement." 291 In essence,
according to Judge Rader, the "free-standing written description requirement"
established by the Lilly opinion was far more exacting than that of enablement and,
in effect, eliminated enablement as a means for "demarking the boundary between
pioneer inventions and patentable improvements',
Replacement of enablement doctrines with an ill-defined general
disclosure doctrine of WD imperils the integrity of the patent system.
Enablement, arguably the most important patent doctrine after
obviousness, has many important applications. Beyond mere adequacy of
disclosure, it serves as the line of demarcation between the visionary
theorist (adds nothing to the useful arts) and the visionary pioneer
(contributes to the useful arts), and also serves to limit claim scope thus
demarking the boundary between pioneer inventions and patentable
292
improvements. The WD possession test cannot perform these functions.
As an indication of the breadth of opinion that existed within the CAFC, at least
at the time of Lilly, Judge Linn, in his dissenting opinion, with whom Judges Rader
and Gajarsa joined, stated that the sufficiency of a written description is measured in
terms of enablement and that "possession of the invention" is not relevant:
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a written description of the invention, but the
measure of the sufficiency of that written description in meeting the
conditions of patentability in paragraph 1 of that statute,

.

.

. should

depend solely on whether it enables any person skilled in the art to which
that invention pertains to make and use the claimed invention ....
287 Id.at

978 (quoting In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A.1976).

Id. at 979 (stating that the "WD, the equivalent of the statutory new matter doctrine,
simply has no application to claims without priority problems").
28) Id.at 976 n.1.
288

290 Id.
291Id. at
292 Id.at

980.
982 (citations omitted).
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Satisfaction of the "possession of the invention" test simply is not
relevant.293
Patent validity in view of the written description requirement of the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, was again at issue in Amgen, Inc. v. Hoeehst Marion
Roussel, Inc. 294 The technology on which the patent was based included expression of
human erythropoietin ("EPO") by transfection of exogenous DNA into a host cell,
such as a Chinese hamster ovary ("CHO") cell. 295

Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.

("TKT"), a co-defendant with Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., employed a method
wherein an endogenous EPO gene in a human cell was activated by transfection of
non-coding DNA into the chromosome of the cell. 296

The claims that Amgen was

asserting against TKT did not include a limitation that the EPO was encoded by
DNA that was exogenous to the host cell. 297 Despite the fact that all of the examples
employed non-native DNA to encode EPO, and that TKT's method of activating
unexpressed, endogenous DNA was not taught, the CAFC held that the specification
298
supported claims that were broad enough to include TKT's human EPO product.
The CAFC distinguished an earlier case relied upon by TKT, Gentry Gallery, Inc. v.
Berklne Corp.299 on the basis that, unlike Gentry, where the claimed invention was

broader than the invention disclosed, Amgen's claimed invention, a non-naturally
occurring human EPO composition, was not broadened by embracing a product made
300
by a method that differed from the method disclosed in the patent specification.
Separately, TKT stated that claim limitations that included "non-naturally
occurring," "vertebrate cells," and "mammalian cells" excluded expression of human
EPO in human cells. 30

1

TKT argued that a variation in language between the

specification and a 1993 application to which priority was claimed indicated an
intentional exclusion from the specification of expressing human DNA in human host

293

Id. at 988 (Linn, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

294

See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F. 3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Id.at 1321.
296 frd.
at 1325.
295

297 Id.("None of the asserted claims contain either an 'exogenous DNA' or 'endogenous DNA'
limitation.").
298 Id. at 1334 ("In light of the evidentiary record and TKT's inability to persuade us that
precedent requires a contrary result, we hold that the district court's finding that Amgen satisfied
the written description requirement is not clearly erroneous.").
299 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
'300
Hoechst, 314 F. 3d 1313, 1333. In distinguishing Hoechst from Gentry, the court noted:
The undisclosed element leading to the Gentry court's holding of invalidity for
lack of an adequate description was a location for the controls other than on the
console-leading to a different and undescribed product .... Amgen's invention
is not the location of the control sequences and EPO DNA in relation to the cell,
but rather the production of human EPO using those sequences. Thus, the
undisclosed element TKT urges invalidates Amgen's product claims is a different
method (endogenous activation) of making the claimed compositions. But, as the
district court noted, under our precedent the patentee need only describe the
invention as claimed, and need not describe an unclaimed method of making the
claimed product.
Id. (citations omitted).
301 Id.at 1327.
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cells.3 0 2 The CAFC concluded that there was no such intent and that these terms
should be "construed ... in a manner consistent with their plain meaning. '' 0d The
court, in essence, relied on what it considered to be a "fair reading" of the
3 04

specification.

TKT also asserted that Amgen "failed to sufficiently describe the use of all
5
The CAFC affirmed the holding by the district
court that the specification adequately described use within the broad classifications
and attributed support for the district court holding to expert testimony which stated
that, although there "might be 'minor differences' in applying the method of the
disclosed examples (utilizing CHO and COS-1 (monkey) cells) . . . those of ordinary
skill could 'easily' figure out those differences in methodology." 30 6 The CAFC held
that Lilly and Enzo II were "inapposite to this case because the claimed terms at
issue here are not new or unknown biological materials that ordinarily skilled
30 7
artisans would easily miscomprehend."
Accordingly, adequacy of written description in Hoeehst was based on a "fair
reading" of the specification to embrace expression of human DNA in human cells,
without limitation to method as applied to composition claims, and without regard to
"minor differences" that could be "easily" figured out by one of ordinary skill in the
art with respect to claims generically embracing "mammalian" and "vertebrate" cells
exemplified only by CHO and COS-1 cells. Therefore, adequacy of the written
description was measured by enablement of one skilled in the art reading the
specification to comprehend claim scope (despite a source of a claimed product
different from that of the specification).
Judge Clevenger, in his dissent, stated that the majority improperly
distinguished Lilly by relying on the fact that the DNA sequences employed in
Amgen's claims were not novel. 308 According to the dissent, Lilly stood for two
vertebrate and mammalian cells." 30

302Id.
303 Id.

at 1328. The court stated:
As a result, we are satisfied that the terms "non-naturally occurring,"
"vertebrate" and "mammalian" should be construed as they were by the district
court, in a manner consistent with their plain meaning. Accordingly, we reject
TKT's attempt to limit the scope of the asserted claims under an unduly
constricted reading of the specification.

Id.
'30 Id. ("Moreover, the specification can fairly be read to, if not expressly, disclose the use of
human DNA in human host cells in culture.. .
305 Id. at 1331.
'306 Id. With respect to the decision by the district court, the CAFC observed that:
[T]he court weighed the testimony and found that the evidence showed that the
descriptions adequately described to those of ordinary skill in the art in 1984 the
use of the broad class of available mammalian and vertebrate cells to produce the
claimed high levels of human EPO in culture .... In so doing, the court credited
in particular the testimony of Amgen's expert, Dr. Harvey Lodish, who testified,
among other things, that there might be 'minor differences' in applying the
method of the disclosed examples (utilizing CHO and COS- 1 (monkey) cells) to
any vertebrate or mammalian cells, but that those of ordinary skill could 'easily'
figure out those differences in methodology. (citations omitted).

Id.
307

Id. at 1332.

308 Id.at

1361.
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broader principles of the written description requirement: "that in haee verba
description of broadly described generic subject matter may not suffice to describe the
subject matter of that particular claim, and that disclosure of a species may not
suffice to describe a genus ... *"309 Judge Clevenger also stated that the failure of
Gentry to recite location of control means was similar to the failure of Amgen's
claims to recite the limitation that the DNA was "exogenous." 310 Judge Clevenger
cautioned that failure to limit claims to embodiments explicit to the specification
would make analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112 more difficult: "But the absence of such
limitations must weigh heavily in the section 112 inquiry, else we hold that claims
become more resistant to written description challenges the more broadly drafted
311
they are."
As discussed above, the permissible breadth of Amgen's claims was limited by
the specification as understood by the skilled artisan.3 12 However, the concern
expressed by Judge Clevenger regarding the potential limitless breadth of claims
could have been allayed by more explicitly basing satisfaction of the first paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 on whether one skilled in the art would understand, in view of the
specification as written, that the scope of the invention included a recombinant
method expressing endogenous DNA, as well as the exogenous embodiments
particularly described. In other words, did the written description of the invention
"enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
313
nearly connected, to make and use the same"?
The controversy regarding interpretation of the written description requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that began in Enzo IIcontinued in Moba v. DiamondAutomation
Inc.3 14 The majority opinion of Moba held that a claim broad enough to encompass a
machine that lifted eggs from a conveyer was not necessarily invalid for failure to
meet the written description requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
despite the fact that the embodiment of the claimed invention in the specification did
not lift eggs directly from a moving conveyer, but rather caused them to be stopped
Id. (Clevenger, J., dissenting). Judge Clevenger stated:
Eli Lilly articulated two principles of the written description requirement: that in
haee vcrba description of broadly described generic subject matter may not suffice
to describe the subject matter of that particular claim, and that disclosure of a
species may not suffice to describe a genus. The district court followed neither of
these principles here, and the majority, dismissing Eli Lilly on the grounds that
no undisclosed DNA molecule appears in this case, verges on confining Eli Lilly to
its facts.
Id. (citations omitted).
'310 Id. In discussing Gentry,Judge Clevenger noted:
Nor am I convinced that the district court's approach was faithful to Gentry
Gallery ....
Because the specification failed to disclose any location for the
controls other than on the console, those claims that lacked such limitations were
invalid under § 112,
1 ....
The question here is similar: whether the claims fail
the written description requirement for lack of "exogenous DNA" limitations,
because the specification discloses only the exogenous DNA technology that was
state of the art in 1984.
309

Id.
311

Id.

312

Id. at 1332.

313

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).

314

Moba v. Diamond Automation, 325 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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prior to lifting.3 15 In particular, the term "holding station" in the relevant claim
(claim 24) of U.S. Patent No. 4,519,505, was interpreted by the court to mean only
that the eggs were controlled; there was no requirement by the claim that the eggs be
316
held in a stationary position prior to lifting.
In explaining the Moba court's holding that the specification met the written
description requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, the court repeated
the familiar wording of the test for compliance: the specification must convey to one
317
skilled in the art, as of the filing date, that the "inventor possessed the invention."
The court identified two applications of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112:
Ruschig, which "inaugurated use of § 112 to prevent the addition of new matter to
claims;" 31 8 and Lilly, which "invoked the written description requirement in a case
without priority issues."3 19
Lilly, Enzo II and Hoechst were all cited for the
proposition that the disclosure need not take any particular form, so long as
possession by the inventor is demonstrated. 320 The CAFC in Moba concluded that,
"accordingly," the jury finding in the lower court with respect to the written
315 Id. at 1321. The court stated:
FPS's [Food Processing Systems/Moba's] contention that the '505 patent does not
adequately disclose lifting eggs from a moving conveyor merely revives its
non-infringement argument in the cloak of a validity challenge. As noted, the jury
found that one of skill in the art would discern possession of the invention at the
time of filing, a finding supported by substantial record evidence. Therefore, the
trial court correctly determined that claim 24 is not invalid for lack of adequate
written description.

Id.
31; Id. at 1315. The court discussed the construction of claim 24 of the '505 patent:
The district court correctly construed the "holding station" of claim 24 of the
'505 patent as "a first location in space to which an egg is moved and at which an
egg may maintain position until the egg is lifted simultaneously with an egg at a
'spaced-apart location.'
Nonetheless FPS argues that the district court's
construction requires that an egg cease motion before the lift to the overhead
conveyer.
The claims simply do not require a specific temporal limitation
associated with the term holding .... ." Moreover, the ordinary meaning of "to
hold" is "to keep in position, guide, control, or manage." This meaning also
imposes no requirement that an object remain stationary.

Id. (citations omitted).
317 Id. at 1320 ("The test for compliance with § 112 has always required sufficient information
in the original disclosure to show that the inventor possessed the invention at the time of the
original filing." (citations omitted)).
318 Id. at 1319 ("Federal Circuit case law reflects two applications of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1. First,
in 1967, this court's predecessor inaugurated use of § 112 to prevent the addition of new matter to
claims." (citations omitted)).
319 Id. at 1320 ("The second application of the written description requirement is reflected in
Regents of University of California v. Eh Lilly & Co. There, this court invoked the written
description requirement in a case without priority issues." (citations omitted)).
320 Moha, 325 F.3d at 1321. In discussing Lilly Enzo Iland Hoechst (identified by the court as
"Amigen"), the court noted:
In Enzo and Amgen, the record showed that the specification that taught one of
skill in the art to make and use an invention also convinced that artisan that the
inventor possessed the invention. Similarly, in this case, the Lilly disclosure rule
does not require a particular form of disclosure because one of skill could
determine from the specification that the inventor possessed the invention at the
time of filing.
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description requirement
of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was supported by
"substantial evidence. ' 321
In his concurring opinion, Judge Rader admonished that CAFC case law
expanding the "written description" requirement beyond a means of "priority
protection" made "no sense." 322 According to Judge Rader, a disclosure that enables a
person skilled in the art to make and use the invention shows "possession of that
invention" under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.323 He criticized the "new"
disclosure requirement of Lllly as lacking a basis in statute or case law:
In 1997, this court inexplicably wrote a new disclosure requirement,
found nowhere in title 35, and attributed that new requirement to the
written description doctrine. This new disclosure doctrine, applied so far
only to biotechnology cases, requires a nucleotide-by-nucleotide recitation of
the structure of a biotechnological invention. Ironically, this court could
have reached the same result in Lilly without making a new disclosure rule.
Under the statute's enablement rule, this court would have also determined
that the invention was not sufficiently disclosed. Instead, this court
presumed to create another doctrine for sufficiency of disclosure. Although
characterized as a written description doctrine, the Lilly rule cannot in fact
324
trace its origin to the statute or any prior case.

'321Id.

The court discussed the juries findings:
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that the '505 patent
is not invalid for lack of an adequate written description. The '505 patent
specification describes every element of claim 24 in sufficient detail so that one of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the inventor possessed the invention
at the time of filing.

Id.
322

Id. at 1322-23 (Rader, J., concurring). Judge Rader stated:
Specifically this court-contrary to the statute and its own thirty-year body of
case law-applies the written description doctrine beyond the purpose for which
the doctrine was created, namely priority protection.
By making written
description a free-standing disclosure doctrine, this court produces numerous
unintended and deleterious consequences.
Under Federal Circuit case law, FPS [Food Processing Systems/Moba] asked this
jury to decide that the patent's disclosure can enable a skilled artisan to make and
practice the invention, but still not inform that same artisan that the inventor
was in possession of the invention. Puzzling ... The Lilly doctrine simply makes
no sense in this context. In fact, outside its proper context of policing priority, it
never makes sense but compounds the confusion, increases the chances for error,
and augments the expense of the trial process.

Id.
323

Id. at 1323. Judge Rader explained:
The language of § 112,
1, indicates that a patent will contain an adequate
description if it provides enough information to enable a person skilled in the art
to make and use the invention. Any disclosure that enables one to make and use
the invention also, by definition, also shows that the inventor was in possession of
that full invention. Consequently, the erroneous written description requirement
of [the] Lilly case lacks both a statutory and a logical foundation.

324

Id. at 1324 (citations omitted).

Id.
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Hoeehst and Enzo flwere interpreted by Judge Rader as a "decline" of the "Lilly
rule" because they explicitly recognized that not all "functional descriptions of genetic
material necessarily [fail] as a matter of law to meet the written description
requirement," and that "deposited material satisfies the Lilly standard if it meets the
enablement standard."325 Judge Rader concluded that, nevertheless, the doctrines of
"written description" and "enablement" remain and overlap, suggesting that this will
be the basis for future confusion:
With some understanding of the difficulties and redundancy of the
Lilly rule, the Federal Circuit has begun to convert it into the enablement
doctrine with a different label. Unfortunately that leaves trial courts in the
fix that the trial court faced in this case-presenting the jury two disclosure
doctrines with apparently overlapping requirements. After all, to enable is
326
to show possession, and to show possession is to enable.
In Judge Bryson's concurring opinion, he stated that he did not "believe that
Lilly constituted a departure from prior law when it applied a written description
requirement in a non-priority context." 327 Specifically, he contested Judge Rader's
interpretation of Rusehig as imposing a distinct written description requirement only
for the purpose of establishing priority.3

28

Judge Bryson then raised the prospect

that recent case law, including Lilly, has misinterpreted 35 U.S.C. § 112 since
Rubehig, and that this is the real question to be taken up en bane:

325Id.

at 1326. Judge Rader discussed the Lillyrule:
Fortunately, the viability of the Lilly rule is on the decline. After Enzo, this
court recognized "that Eli Lilly did not hold that all functional descriptions of
genetic material necessarily fails as a matter of law to meet the written
description requirement, rather, the requirement may be satisfied if in the
knowledge of the art the disclosed function is sufficiently correlated to a
particular, known structure." Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1332, 1361 (dissent: "[T]he
majority verges on confirming Elill]y to its facts.").
In this case, as in Enzo, the court explained that the written description
requirement is satisfied when "one of skill in the art would discern possession of
the invention at the time of filing." Indeed, the Enzo court struggled to
distinguish the so-called written description requirement from enablement. In
reversing its original decision that deposits of biological material do not satisfy
the written description requirement, the Enzo panel cited cases that found that
such deposits satisfy the enablement requirement. In other words, because Lilly
did in fact compel the result of the original Enzo panel, the court on
reconsideration had to concede that deposited material satisfies the Lilly standard
if it meets the enablement standard.

Id.
326Moba, 325

F.3d at 1326 (Rader, J., concurring).
1327 (Bryson, J., concurring).
Id. In contesting Judge Rader's opinion, Judge Bryson noted:
The problem, as I see it, is that if it is correct to read section 112 as containing a
separate written description requirement, it is difficult to find a principled basis
for restricting that requirement to cases involving priority disputes. There is no
language in section 112 that would support such a restriction ....

'327
Id.at

328
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Perhaps the entire line of cases stemming from Rusehig is wrong, and
perhaps we should at some point address that question en bane. I take no
position on that issue at this juncture. I think it is worth pointing out,
however, that the real question raised by Judge Rader's statutory analysis
is not whether Lilly was an unwarranted departure from the Ruschigline of
cases, but whether that entire line of cases is based on a fundamentally
flawed construction of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1.329

3. Summary of Developments of the Written Description Requirement Under the
PatentAct of 1952 Priorto Rochester
The question of whether a patent specification enables one skilled in the art
either to select a claimed invention from broad teachings, to comprehend the scope of
an invention as broadly claimed from specific embodiments taught, or to understand
an invention as claimed to be equivalent to the language of the specification, predates
the Patent Act of 1952. Even after 1952, such inquiries have been interpreted
variously under 35 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 132, or without any statutory basis.
Rusehig was not the first case under the Patent Act of 1952 to assess sufficiency
of support for claim scope, regardless of reliance on the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §
112. The facts in Ruschig are similar to those in prior cases, including Prutton,
discussed above, wherein, as in Ruschig, the court held that claims to a specific
330
compound are not supported by a general description of a class of compounds.
Pruttonwas decided in 1956, well before Rusehig,and did not make specific reference
to 35 U.S.C. § 112. However, Rainer, which also was decided prior to Rusehig and,
also like Ruschig,addressed support for claims directed to use of particular materials
in light of a broad disclosure, does make reference to 35 U.S.C. § 112.331
Contrary to Judge Rader's assertion,33 2 sufficiency of a written description was
addressed separately, or at least distinguished from enablement, in cases decided
after Ruschig and before Lilly and Enzo II, without reference to priority. The court
in In re Robins, 333 which was not listed in Judge Rader's appendix in Enzo III of
"written description cases," for example, addressed inclusion of representative
examples to specifically support generic language as an issue distinct from priority
and dealing with the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112:
Mention of representative compounds encompassed by generic claim
language clearly is not required by § 112 or any other provision of the
statute. But, where no explicit description of a generic invention is to be
found in the specification (which is not the case here) mention of
32)

Id. at 1328.

330 See generally Prutton v. Fuller, 230 F.2d 459 (C.C.P.A. 1956); supra Part II.C.1 (discussing

Prutton).
331 In re Rainer, 347 F.2d 574, 575 (C.C.P.A. 1965) ("As a basic proposition we note that section
112 necessarily requires us to determine what 'the invention' is and Patent Office Rule 71(b)
requires us to go further and determine the 'precise invention' for which the patent is solicited."); see
also supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Rainer).
332 See supra Part II.C.2.
333 In re Robins, 429 F.2d 452 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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representative compounds may provide an implicit description upon which
to base generic claim language .... It also has been one way of teaching
how to make and/or use the claimed invention, thus satisfying that aspect of
§ 112.334
Judge Rich, for the court in Robins, held that the specification of the patent
application met the requirements of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, including
"a statement of appellants' invention, which is as broad as appellants' broadest
claims" and "sufficiency of the specification to satisfy the 'best mode' requirement of §
112 and to enable one skilled in the art to practice appellants' process as broadly as it
is claimed." 335 There is no discussion in Robins whether the claims were amended
after filing to include the language at issue.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in DiLeon 336 cited Robins, and, like
Robins, was an appeal from a decision by the Board. According to the court in
DiLeone, "[tihe sole issue is whether the specification satisfies the description
requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, with respect to claims of the
breadth sought here."3 3 7
The enablement and description requirements were
explicitly partitioned by the court.3 3 8 The court in DiLeone cited Ahlbrecht as a
specific example of a case wherein the description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was
not satisfied with respect to a class of compounds, despite the fact that the same class
was enabled. 339 Although Ahlbrecht was a "priority" case cited by Judge Rader in his
dissent in Enzo II, the court in DiLeone did not refer to priority when it relied on
340
Robins and Ahlbrecht to state that an invention may be enabled but not described.
To the contrary, the court in DiLeone explicitly stated that the claim language at
341
issue "appeared in the originally filed claims."
Further, and also contrary to Judge Rader's concurring opinion in Moba, the
written description requirement as set forth by the CAFC in Lilly was not new, but
instead followed legal precedent. For example, the Lilly court cited Fiersin support
of its statement that, even in the case of cDNA, an adequate written description
"requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name or
physical properties." 342 Both the Lilly and Enzo H courts, as in many earlier cases,

34 Id. at 456-57 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Footnote 8 in Robins further states: "In
Sus, the rejection was based on the second paragraph of § 112. For the reasons given in In re
Hallack,; In re Borkowsk; and In re Wakefield, such rejections are more properly considered under
the first paragraph of that section." Id. at 457 n.8 (citations omitted).
335 Id. at 456.
'336 In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
37 Id. at 1405 (emphasis added).
338 Soo supraPart II.C.1.

'339 Dileone, 436 F.2d at 1405 ("In In re Ahlbrecht... decided January 7, 1971, we held that the
description requirement had not been satisfied as to a claimed class of esters, even though the
specification might have indirectly enabled one skilled in the art to make and use the entire class."
(citations omitted)).
340 Id. ("It is clear from Robins and Albrecht that it is possible for an invention to enable the
practice of an invention as broadly as it is claimed, and still not describe that invention.").
341 Id. at 1406 ("Moreover, we note that the expression in question [that of 'a different
dianhydride of an organic tetracarboxylic acid'] appeared in the originally filed claims.").
342 Regents of Univ. of Cal v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The court
acknowledged that:
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relied upon, or drew parallels with enablement considerations in their
determinations of satisfaction of the written description requirement. The court in
Lilly stated that a genus claim, even of genetic material, may be adequately
supported by a written description that does not list every species; sufficiency of the
written description may be achieved by means "analogous to enablement of a genus
under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 by showing the enablement of a
representative number of species within the genus."3 43 Similarly, and as noted by
Judge Rader, the holding by the Enzo H court that public availability of a deposit of
genetic material is sufficient to meet the written description requirement, at least
implicitly suggests a connection between the written description requirement and
344
enablement by one skilled in the art.

III. ROCHESTER REVISITED
As discussed above, the CAFC in Rochester f/f45 affirmed a lower court
decision 346 holding that claims directed to a method of inhibiting prostaglandin H
synthase-2 ("PGHS-2," or "COX-2") activity in a human host by administering a
non-steroidal compound which selectively inhibits PGHS-2 gene product were invalid
for failure to meet the written description requirement under the first paragraph of
35 U.S.C. § 112.34 7 The CAFC did not reach a decision with respect to the lower
courts' holding that the same claims also were invalid for lack of enablement under
35 U.S.C. § 112.348
As had many cases since Rusehig, the analysis by the CAFC stemmed from the
premise that the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 includes a "written description
requirement," an "enablement requirement," and a "best mode requirement." 349 The

An adequate written description of a DNA, such as the cDNA of the
recombinant plasmids and microorganisms of the '525 patent, "requires a precise
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,"
not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention. Fiers v.
Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. (1993).

Id.
343

Id. at 1569. The court noted that:
A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation of a
representative number of cDNAs, defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within
the scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to the
members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the
genus. This is analogous to enablement of a genus under § 112,
1, by showing
the enablement of a representative number of species within the genus.

Id.
'1 Moba v. Diamond Automation, 325 F.3d 1306, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader, J., concurring)
("In other words, because Lilly did in fact compel the result of the original Enzo panel, the court on
reconsideration had to concede that deposited material satisfies the Lilly standard if it meets the
enablement requirement.").
345 Rohesterlj, 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
346 Rochester, 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
347 Rochester I, 358 F.3d at 930.
348 Id. at 929-30 ("In view of our affirmance of the district court's decision on the written
description ground, we consider the enablement issue to be moot and will not discuss it further.").
34) Id. at 921.
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CAFC employed the example of DiLeone, discussed above, to state that "an invention
may be enabled even though it has not been described" and that, conversely, a
"specification can likewise describe an invention without enabling the practice of the
350

The CAFC also recited the holding in Rusehig that,
despite broad enablement by the specification, the specific compound claimed was not
351
taught by the specification.
Extrapolating the logic of Rusehig, the CAFC quoted Enzo II and stated that,
while claimed subject matter need not be described in haee verba, the written
description requirement "must still be met in some way so as to 'describe the claimed
full breadth of its claims."

invention so that one skilled in the art can recognize what is claimed."' 352 Using an

analogy, the CAFC stated that use of the word "automobile," as that label would be
interpreted in the nineteenth century, would not describe a "newly invented
automobile," without further including in the description components of the claimed
invention:
Similarly, for example, in the nineteenth century, use of the word
"automobile" would not have sufficed to describe a newly invented
automobile; an inventor would need to describe what an automobile is, viz.,
a chassis, an engine, seats, wheels on axles, etc. Thus, generalized
language may not suffice if it does not convey the detailed identity of an
invention. In this case, there is no language here, generalized or otherwise,
353
that describes compounds that achieve the claimed effect.
By this statement, the CAFC, in effect, imposed a categorical requirement of physical
identity without specifying what or how much identity is required. In particular,
using the CAFC's analogy, no explanation is provided for determining the limits of
"viz." and "etc." Further, the CAFC appears to overlook that subject matter is
defined by how it is claimed, regardless of whether the combination of, for example, a
chassis, an engine, seats, and wheels on axles reads on what is commonly known as
an automobile or some other device, such as a golf cart, a crane, or a locomotive. The
CAFC also does not address the fact that a single well-recognized device, such as an
automobile, can be defined in different ways which may not overlap. For example,
one skilled in the art may recognize an automobile defined by the combined features

350Rohesterl,
351

358 F.3d 916, 921-22 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

Id. at 922. When looking to In re Rusehi, the court stated:
In reaching its decision, the court observed that the claimed compound was not
described in the specification and would not "convey clearly to those skilled in the
art, to whom it is addressed, in any way, the information that appellants invented

that specific compound".....
It did not teach the specific compound.
Id. (citations omitted).
352 Id. at 923. The Roeheste-rII court, however, quoted only the latter portion of the sentence.
The complete sentence from Enzo H specifies that, even where the language of claims is supported,

the specification, "to the extent possible," must describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in
art can recognize what is claimed. Enzo -I 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Even if a claim is
supported by the specification, the language of the specification, to the extent possible, must
describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in the art can recognize what is claimed."
(emphasis added)).
353 RochesterII, 358 F.3d at 923.
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of a steering wheel, a windshield, a transmission, and a speedometer, as opposed to
the features cited in the analogy.
The CAFC relied on Jepson v. Coleman354 to state that, even prior to Rusehig,
"our predecessor court explicitly rejected the notion that an enabling disclosure
necessarily satisfies the written description requirement."3 55 However, Jepson was
directed to sufficiency of a specification to entitle a senior party in an interference to
make claims, and nowhere mentions 35 U.S.C. § 112.356 A quotation taken from
Jepson by the Rochester Ilcourt, requiring that the "application necessarily" disclose
the particular device,3 57 refers to the issue in Rusehig and other cases before and
after Rusehig, wherein the specification was found not to adequately direct one
skilled in the art to select a specific claimed embodiment from broad teachings of the
disclosure.358
In re Moore and In re Sus were also cited by the CAFC in Roehester II to
support the position that a written description requirement was recognized before
RuSehig. 59 In Moore, the claims were broader than the invention as taught in the
specification.360 The court in Moore, in fact, referred to enablement in conjunction
361
with establishing what one would understand to be appellant's invention.
Similarly, Sus related to breadth of the invention, as claimed, given teachings that
only specific embodiments would be suitable for a particular purpose. 362 Sus, like

,54Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
'35

Rohesterl, 358 F.3d at 923.

See generallyJepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
Rochester l, 358 F.3d at 923 ("It is not a question whether one skilled in the art might be
able to construct the patentee's device from the teachings of the disclosure of the application.
Rather, it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device."
(quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d at 536)).
'35 Jepson, 314 F.2d at 536. The court stated:
Unquestionably appellees in their specification accurately and concisely
disclose each and every feature of their preferred embodiment and in the so-called
'critical paragraph' herein quoted, they negatively disclose a different blanket
than described as their preferred embodiment. That different blanket may or may
not have all the features of appellant's device [as claimed]. Certainly it could, but
is that sufficient to satisfy the law on this subject? We think not.
Id.
31 Roehesterlj 358 F.3d at 923.
'360 In re Moore, 155 F.2d 379, 382 (C.C.P.A. 1946) ("We are of the opinion that claims 2 and 3
are broader than the disclosure in appellant's application and that they were properly rejected for
that reason.").
356
357

'361

Id. The court noted that:
[A]ppellant's application is limited, as stated by the Primary Examiner and as
hereinbefore noted, to so-called "fumigants," and there is nothing in the
application to indicate that appellant's composition would kill insects when
applied in either solid or liquid form. On the contrary, appellant states in his
application that his alleged "invention in its broadestaspect is concerned with the
discovery that all members of the generic class of monosubstituted acetonitriles
which have a boiling point below 200 [degrees] C. are useful as fumigants."

Id.
3 2 In

re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1962). The court reasoned:
Thus, it seems to us that one skilled in this art would not be taught by the
written description of the invention in the specification that any "aryl or
substituted aryl radical" would be suitable for the purposes of the invention but
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Moore, at least peripherally considered enablement in conjunction with sufficiency of

disclosure.

363

In neither Jepson, Moore nor Sus was a statutory minimum requirement for
written description set forth that was distinct from that of enabling one skilled in the
art to understand how to make and use the invention. To the contrary, all of these
cases addressed sufficiency of the written description of a specification from the
364
perspective of enabling one skilled in the art to select the claimed invention.
Moreover, as discussed supra, where adequate support for a claimed invention was at
issue, there are other cases predating Rusehig that did not rely on a distinct
statutory requirement for a written description that was separate from enablement
under 35 U.S.C. § 112; some relied on Rule 71(b)365 or did not explicitly rely on any
statute or rule. 366 Prior to Rusehi, sufficiency of written description was not
considered to be a statutory requirement separate from enablement.
The RoehesterH court provided further historical support for a separate written
description requirement by reciting the Supreme Court case of EvansQ67 which was
decided under the Patent Act of 1793. According to the Rochester IIcourt, although
the patent statute has changed "extensively" since 1822, it was "not very different in
its articulation of the written description requirement."3 68
As discussed above,
contrary to the statement by Judge Lourie in Rochester I, the language of the Patent
Act of 1952 is very different than that of the Patent Act of 1793, if for no other
reason than because of changes that were made with respect to requirements of the
written description.
The Rochester H court also interpreted the earlier cases of Fiers,Lilly, and Enzo
I, which the University of Rochester attempted to distinguish as being limited to
DNA-based inventions. 369 Although the court acknowledged that these cases all
related to genetic material, it refused to so limit application of the statute under
these cases.3 70 The CAFC then recited guidelines adopted in Enzo H regarding
satisfaction of the written description:

rather that only certain aryl radicals and certain specifically substituted aryl
radicals would be suitable for such purposes.

Id.
363 Id. at n.7 ("We question also whether all 'aryl and substituted aryl radicals' would produce
light-sensitive aromatic azides insoluble in water but soluble in organic solvents as is required by
the invention disclosed in the specification.").
364Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (C.C.P.A. 1963); Moore, 155 F.2d at 382; Szs, 306
F.2d at 497.
'365See, e.g., In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769 (C.C.P.A. 1962); In re Rainer, 347 F.2d 574 (C.C.P.A.
1965).
366 See, e.g., Prutton v. Fuller, 230 F.2d 459 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
'367
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 433-34 (1822).
368 Rochester If,358 F.3d 916, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Although the patent statutes have been
extensively revised since 1822, most notably in the addition of the requirement of claims, the
language of the present statute is not very different in its articulation of the written description
requirement.").
369Rochester I, 358 F.3d at 925 ("Rochester also argues that Fiers v. Revel, Lilly and Enzo
are all distinguished because they were limited to DNA-based inventions." (citation omitted)).
370 Id. ("We agree with Rochester that Fiers, Lilly and Enzo differ from this case in that they
all related to genetic material whereas this case does not, but we find that distinction to be
unhelpful to Rochester's position. It is irrelevant; the statute applies to all types of inventions.").
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In Enzo, we explained that functional descriptions of genetic material can,
in some cases, meet the written description requirement if those functional
characteristics are "coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between
37 1
function and structure, or some combination of such characteristics."
However, the CAFC recited only a portion of the written description guidelines
recited in Enzo II. The portion of the written description guidelines quoted by Enzo
II was not limited to functional characteristics coupled with correlation between
function and structure as an alternative to a complete description of structure. The
complete quote taken from Enzo Ilprovides for additional alternatives:
In its Guidelines, the PTO has determined that the written description
requirement can be met by "showing that an invention is complete by
disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics ...
i.e., complete or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical properties,
functional characteristics when coupled with a known or disclosed
correlation between function and structure, or some combination of such
37 2
characteristics."
Further, the analysis applied in Enzo IIwas not limited to nucleic acid sequences; it
also included a determination of the functional characteristics of preferential binding
of claimed antibodies in combination with the structural characteristics of known
classes of antibody. As stated by the court in Enzo IT.
For example, the PTO would find compliance with § 112,
1, for a claim to
an "isolated antibody capable of binding to an antigen X," notwithstanding
the functional definition of the antibody, in light of the "well defined
structural characteristics for the five classes of antibody, the functional
characteristics of antibody binding, and the fact that the antibody
technology is well developed and mature." ... Thus, under the Guidelines,
the written description requirement would be met for all of the claims of the
'659 patent if the functional characteristic of preferential binding to N.
gonorrhoeaeover N. meningitides were coupled with a disclosed correlation
between that function and a structure that is sufficiently known or
disclosed. We are persuaded by the Guidelines on this point and adopt the
PTO's applicable standard for determining compliance with the written
373
description requirement.
The CAFC in Rochester II appeared to be much more restrictive in its
application of the USPTO Guidelines than was the CAFC in Enzo II. Specifically, the
Rochester II court employed an example of an application of the USPTO Guidelines
wherein complementary strands of nucleic acids could easily be deduced from any
given strand of DNA or RNA, and then stated that, in contrast, even providing
three-dimensional structures of enzymes may not be sufficient:
371

Id.

372

Enzo 1, 323 F.2d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
(citations omitted).

373 Id.
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Given the sequence of a single strand of DNA or RNA, it may therefore have
become a routine matter to envision the precise sequence of a
"complementary" strand that will bind to it. Therefore, disclosure of a DNA
sequence might support a claim to the complementary molecules that can
hybridize to it.
The same is not necessarily true in the chemical arts more generally.
Even with the three-dimensional structures of enzymes such as COX-1 and
COX-2 in hand, it may even now not be within the ordinary skill in the art
to predict what compounds might bind to and inhibit them, let alone have
been within the purview of one of ordinary skill in the art in the 19931995 period in which the applications that led to the '850 patent were filed.
Rochester and its experts do not offer any persuasive evidence to the
374
contrary.
The University of Rochester also distinguished Fiers,Lilly, and Enzo Ias
limited to composition of matter claims.

375

being

The CAFC dismissed this as a semantic

distinction and stated that, either by actual or constructive reduction to practice, the
"specification must teach the invention by describing it."376 The CAFC further stated
that, absent identification in the patent specification of any compounds by the
disclosed assays, the claimed methods of their use cannot be practiced. 377 Lilly was
relied upon by the CAFC to state that, without identification of compounds that
selectively inhibit PGHS-2, the specification represents a "mere wish or plan for
obtaining the claimed invention":
As pointed out by the district court, however, the '850 patent does not
disclose just "which 'peptides, polynucleotides, and small organic molecules'
have the desired characteristic of selectively inhibiting PGHS-2." Without
such disclosure, the claimed methods cannot be said to have been described.
As we held in Lilly, "an adequate written description of a DNA ... 'requires
a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or
physical properties,' not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed
chemical invention." For reasons stated above, that requirement applies
just as well to non-DNA (or [non]-RNA) chemical inventions. 378
However, as discussed above, the CAFC in Fiers, Lilly and Enzo II employed
analyses that incorporated lack of certainty in methods for isolating a gene of
interest or lack of knowledge of the amino acid sequence of the protein encoded by

RohesterlI,358 F.3d 916, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 926 ("Rochester also attempts to distinguish Fiers, Lilly, and Enzo by suggesting that
the holdings in those cases were limited to composition of matter claims.").
376 Id. ("We agree with the district court that that is 'a semantic distinction without a
difference' ..... The specification must teach the invention by describing it." (citations omitted)).
377 Id. at 927 ('[]t is undisputed that the '850 patent does not disclose any compounds that can
be used in its claimed methods. The claimed methods thus cannot be practiced based on the patent's
specification, even considering the knowledge of one skilled in the art.").
378Id. (citations omitted).
374
375
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the gene.3 79 Further, the CAFC in Fiers relied on Amgen for support in discussing
the inadequacies of a description that represents merely a "wish ... or a plan": "As
we stated in Amgen and reaffirmed above, such a disclosure just represents a wish,
or arguably a plan, for obtaining the DNA."380 The Amgen court, in turn, like Fiers,
Lilly and Enzo H included enablement in its analysis: "Based on the uncertainties of
the method and lack of information concerning the amino acid sequence of the EPO
protein, the trial court was correct in concluding that neither party had an adequate
conception of the DNA sequence until reduction to practice had been achieved ... 3
Therefore, in each of Amgen, Fiers, Lilly, and Enzo , sufficiency of the description of
the invention hinged, at least in part, on lack of predictability of the methods
described to obtain the claimed genetic material, thus necessitating either
identification of the nucleotide sequence or a publicly accessible deposit.
Identification of a structure of a compound was required where the methods provided
were not sufficiently certain to enable the skilled artisan to isolate or identify the
claimed gene, or where a publicly accessible deposit had not been made.
2
The University of Rochester relied on Union Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield C.38
[hereinafter UnocaA as legal precedent to support claims describing a composition by
"desired characteristics" rather than "exact chemical components." 38 3 The Rochester
H court, in response, distinguished the facts of Unocal by stating that, unlike that
case: "Rochester did not present any evidence that the ordinarily skilled artisan
would be able to identify any compound based on its vague functional description as a
'non-steroidal compound that selectively inhibits activity of the PGHS-2 gene
product."'3 8 4 Without questioning the discovery of the inventors or the ability of the
assay to distinguish between PGHS-1 and PGHS-2 inhibitors, the Rochester H court
further stated that, in the absence of novelty of any compounds identified by the
assay, the claims of the '850 patent would not be novel. 38 5 In dicta, therefore, the
CAFC effectively barred patentability of the claimed therapeutic method unless
compounds identified by the assays would not only selectively inhibit PGHS-2
activity, but be novel as well.
Two other cases, In re Edward s8 6 and In re Herschler, 387 relied upon by the
388
University of Rochester, also were distinguished by the CAFC as inapposite.
See supraPart II.C.2 (discussing Fiers,Lilly and Enzo I1i.
Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
'81s Amgen v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1991)..
382 Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
383 Roehosteor±l 358 F.3d at 926.
'38 Id.
at 928.
385 Id. at 928 n.7. The court noted that:
Indeed, if compounds that selectively inhibit activity of the PGHS-2 gene
product had been known in the art, it is difficult to see how the claims of the '850
patent would have satisfied the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102. After all,
the novelty of those claims, if any, would appear to reside in the fact that
COX-2-selective inhibitors were previously unknown. The issue of patentability
under § 102, however, was not decided by the district court, and we do not address
it further.
379
380

Id.
386
387
38

In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Roehesterl, 358 F.3d at 928.
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Specifically, the CAFC stated that, with respect to Edwards, the written description
requirement for a claimed compound was satisfied by teaching a method to make the
compound:
In Edwards, the court held that the written description requirement was
satisfied by a specification that described a claimed compound by the
process by which it is made, rather than by its structure, because the court
found that Edward's application, "taken as a whole, reasonably leads
persons skilled in the art to the [recited reactions] and, concomitantly, to
the claimed compound. 38 9
According to the Rochester II court, the specification provided by the University of
Rochester provided no method for making "even a single non-steroidal compound that
390
selectively inhibits activity of the PGHS-2 gene product."
However, the issue in Edwards was not, as described by the CAFC in Rochester
II, whether "the written description requirement was satisfied by a specification that
described a claimed compound by the process by which it is made, rather than by its
structure .

. . ."391

On the contrary, the CAFC accepted that a claimed compound can

be described by the method of making it and that the "primary concern is whether
the description requirement has been complied with, not the mode selected for
compliance." 392 The issue in Edwards was whether, on facts of that case, a parent
application complied with the "written description requirement." 393 The CAFC in
Edwards found that, "on the facts of this case, an adequate description of the
aforementioned reactions is, concomitantly, an adequate description of the claimed
394
compound."
As applied to the facts of Rochester 1/, the "mode selected for compliance" with
the written description requirement under Edwards could have been the assay
described in the University of Rochester's '850 Patent. Under such an analysis, on
the facts of Rochester 1/, an adequate description of the selective assay could have
been found to reasonably lead a person skilled in the art to selective inhibitors and,
"concomitantly," to the claimed therapeutic method for their use.
With respect to Hersehler,the Rochester II court stated that claims directed to
concurrent topical administration of a steroidal agent and dimethyl sulfoxide
("DMSO") were supported by a specification that included only one example of a

38) Id. (quoting In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1354 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
'390 Id at 928 ("In marked contrast to the Edwards application, the specification of the '850
patent contains no disclosure of any method for making even a single 'non-steroidal compound that

selectively inhibits activity of the PGHS-2 gene product."').
'39'Id.
392 Edwards, 568

F.2d at 1352 ("As the board apparently recognized, the description in the
parent is not intrinsically defective me-rely because appellants chose to describe their claimed
compound by the process of making it; our primary concern is whether the description requirement
has been complied with, not the mode selected for compliance.").
393 d. at 1351 ("In the context of the present case, this translates into whether the parent
application provides adequate direction which reasonably leads persons skilled in the art to the later
claimed compound .... By the very nature of this inquiry, each case turns on its own specific facts."
(citations omitted)).
394 Id. at 1352.
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"physiologically active steroidal agent." 395 The distinction from Hersehler,according
to the Rochester HI court, was that many steroidal agents were known, unlike
"non-steroidal compounds that selectively inhibit[ ] activity of the PGHS-2 gene
product." 396 Again, the Rochester II court seemed to rely on the belief that
patentability of the '850 patent claims resided in the novelty of compounds that
selectively inhibit PGHS-2 activity: "As the court there [in Herschler noted, 'were
this application drawn to novel 'steroidal agents,' a different question would be
397
posed.' The novelty in that invention was the DMSO solvent, not the steroids."
In fact, the novelty in Hersbehler was not of DMSO, but the use of DMSO in
combination with a steroidal agent. 398 The issue in Hersehlerwas whether adequate
support for a claim limitation directed to a class of compounds (e.g., steroids) was met
by a
specification
that identified
only one member
of the
class
(glucocorticosteroids). 399 The court concluded in the affirmative. 400 Specifically, the
court held that, with respect to the claimed method of enhancing penetration by use
of steroids in combination with DMSO,identification of only one member of the class
of steroids was, in fact, sufficient:
Steroids, when considered as drugs, have a broad scope of physiological
activity. On the other hand, steroids, when considered as a class of
compounds carried through a layer of skin by DMSO, appear on this record
to be chemically quite similar. The diversity of exemplified materials
"potentiated" by DMSO in the great-grandparent application, is much
broaderthan the diversity of steroid compounds shown contemporaneously
in the art. In this instance, we conclude that one having ordinary skill in
this art would have found the use of the subgenus of steroids to be apparent
401
in the written description of the great-grandparent application.
As further stated by the court in Hersehier:
In sum, claims drawn to the use of known chemical compounds in a
manner auxiliary to the invention must have a corresponding written
description only so specific as to lead one having ordinary skill in the art to
that class of compounds. Occasionally, a functional recitation of those
RochesterI, 358 F.3d at 928.
396 Id. ("Critically, however, there was no question in that case that, unlike 'non-steroidal
compounds that selectively inhibit[] activity of the PGHS-2 gene product,' numerous physiologically
active steroidal agents were known to those of ordinary skill in the art.").
37 Id. (quoting Hersehler,591 F.2d at 701).
398 In ro Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 695 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("The appellant has found that DMSO
enhances the penetration of a number of materials through skin tissue. In the application at hand,
a mixture of DMSO and a 'physiologically active steroidal agent' is administered to skin (or a
mucous membrane) with the result that the steroid penetrates the membrane.").
'3 Id. at 696 ('We have carefully considered the great-grandparent case but the only
disclosure relating to steroids . . . is limited to gluco-corticosteroids ......
(quoting Patent and
Trademark Office Board of Appeals, No. 304,283)).
400 Id.at 701 ("The question is simple: does the array of information supplied by appellant in
the great-grandparent application teach one having ordinary skill in this art that one of the class of
steroids will operate in the claimed process. We conclude that it does.").
401 Id.
'3
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known compounds
402
description.

in

the

specification

may

be

sufficient

as that

Therefore, contrary to the position of the Rochester II court, patentability of the
claimed method in Hersehierdid not rely upon novelty of DMSO as a compound, but
rather in the therapeutic use of such compounds. Further, the court in Hersehier,as
in other cases decided prior to Roehester HI, did not categorically dismiss functional
definitions of compounds employed in a claimed method. The '850 patent provides a
description of a class of compounds functionally identifiable, in the case of Roehester
II by an assay, the enablement of which the court did not address.
After dismissing a plea by amici 40 3 asserting that the "[ciourt's decision will have
a significant impact on the continuing viability of technology transfer programs at
universities and on the equitable allocation of intellectual property rights between
universities and the private sector," 40 4 the Rochester II court summarized the failure
of the '850 patent as not providing "any guidance" to compounds suitable for use in
the claimed methods:
In sum, because the '850 patent does not provide any guidance that
would steer the skilled practitioner toward compounds that can be used to
carry out the claimed methods-an essential element of every claim of that
patent-and has not provided evidence that any such compounds were
otherwise within the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art at
the relevant time, Rochester has failed to raise any question of material fact
40 5
whether the named inventors disclosed the claimed invention.
Contrary to the CAFC's statement, the assay described in the '850 patent
specification was the guidance to a skilled practitioner necessary to identify
compounds that would be employed in the method claimed. There is no allegation by
the court that the assay described would not, in fact, identify existing compounds
that selectively inhibit PGHS-2 activity, nor that the amount of experimentation
employing the assay to identify any such compounds would be undue, thereby
rendering the specification non-enabling. There also is no allegation by the court
that, if such a compound were identified, the disclosure would not provide an
adequate written description for its use, as claimed by the '850 patent. 406
Instead, the CAFC concluded that, absent disclosure of a PGHS-2 (COX-2)
selective compound, or "pre-existing awareness in the art of any compound having
COX-2 selective activity," the '850 patent clearly and convincingly proves its own
invalidity:
402 Id.at

702
Brief of Amici Curiae The Regents of the University of California et al., Univ. of Rochester
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (2003) (No. 04-476).
401Rohesterl, 358 F.3d 916, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
405 Id.
406 This article does not address general discussions of "reach-through claims" such as are
described in EPO, JPO & USPTO, TRILATERAL PROJECT B31, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN SEARCH
AND EXAMINATION: REPORT ON COMPARATIVE STUDY ON BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT PRACTICES (Nov.
2001),
available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi-e/kokusai-e/tws/report/B3b-report pdf/B3b_
reachthroughtext.pdf (last visited May 19, 2005).
403
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Although section 282 of the PatentAct places the burden of proof on
the party seeking to invalidate a patent, it does not foreclose the possibility
of that party demonstrating that the patent in suit proves its own
invalidity, and as detailed in section I above, we conclude that the '850
patent clearly and convincingly does just that. The patent's claims all
require a COX-2-selective compound, but no COX-2-selective compound is
disclosed in the patent, and it is undisputed that there was no pre-existing
407
awareness in the art of any compound having COX-2-selective activity.

IV. IMPLICATIONS
Judge Newman, in her dissent from the order by the CAFC denying a petition
for rehearing and denying a petition for rehearing en bane the Rochester II decision,
stated that she fully shared Judge Lourie's understanding of the law, and that "it is
simply incorrect to say that there is not now and never has been a 'written
description' requirement in the patent law." 408 She concisely summarized "past
decisions .. .offered to support the exotic proposition that it is not necessary for the
inventor to describe the patented invention, but that enablement alone suffices under
the statute," as "traditional issues of generic disclosures and specific examples, and
questions of support and predictability for scientific concepts and their
409
embodiments."
However, the heart of the issue is not elimination of a requirement that the
invention be described, but the gauge for measuring compliance with the
requirement. The danger of a free-standing written description requirement is
exemplified in Judge Rader's dissenting opinion. In his dissent, Judge Rader
reasserted his position, first announced in his dissent in Enzo III, that the modern
"written description" requirement was first established in 1967, and only to "police
priority."410 According to Judge Rader, the CAFC in Lilly established, without legal
basis, a new doctrine (the "Eli Lilly doctrine") that requires the specification to
provide "adequate support" for the claims:
In simple terms, contrary to logic and the statute itself, Eli Lilly requires
one part of the specification (the written description) to provide "adequate
support" for another part of the specification (the claims). Neither Eli Lilly
nor this case has explained either the legal basis for this new validity
407Rochester , 358 F.3d at 930 (citations omitted) (The relevant portion of 35 U.S.C. § 282
referenced is:"The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the
party asserting such invalidity.").
408 RoehesterIII,375 F.3d 1303, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., dissenting).
409 Id.
410 Id. at 1311 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Beginning in 1967, this court and its predecessor applied the written description
language to achieve this vital purpose of the Patent Act-tying disclosure to the
time of invention. In the words of Judge Rich, the first judge to use the
description requirement to police priority, "[t]he function of the description
requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of
the application relied on, of the specific subject matter ]aterclaimed by him."
Id. (citations omitted).
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requirement or the standard for "adequate support." Because this new
judge-made doctrine has created enormous confusion which this court
4 11
declines to resolve, I respectfully dissent.
Judge Rader did not deny the existence of a written description requirement, but
restricted its proper application to determinations of priority. 412 Regardless of its
intended purpose, the question raised by Judge Rader of the standard for "adequate
support" under the written description requirement remains.
A hypothetical relied upon in the majority opinion of Rochester H was employed
by Judge Rader in his dissent in Rochester HIto explain why extension of the written
description requirement beyond policing priority is "both superfluous and
dangerous." 413 As described by Judge Radar:
Rochester refers to a situation where a patent can enable an
invention that is not described by the specification. In the words of
the opinion, "[siuch can occur when enablement of a closely related
invention A that is both described and enabled would similarly enable
414
an invention B ifB were described."
415
As described in Section III.C.1, this hypothetical was also presented in DiLeone.
Judge Rader asserted that such a hypothetical "rarely, if ever, happens." 416 In
support of this position, he employed an analogy of an invention that "solves a
problem that enables those of ordinary skill in the art to know how to make and use
both a radio and a TV." 417 According to the hypothetical, the inventor describes only
a radio but broadly claims an "electrical receiver." 4 18 Judge Rader raised two issues
associated with this hypothetical. First, he contended that, if television truly were
enabled, the inventor would have disclosed and claimed it, even if only in a separate
application, and that for this "very practical reason, no case has ever presented the
hypothetical." 419 Second, it was his position that, "if the radio inventor for some
unfathomable reason does not grasp that he has enabled a TV and later asserts the

411 M. at 1307-08 (Rader,J., dissenting).
412 Id.at

1311 (Rader, J., dissenting). In discussing the written description requirement, Judge

Rader stated: "In fact, every application of the written description doctrine before Eli Lilly in 1997
applied the written description doctrine for this important purpose and only for this important
purpose." Id. The "important purpose" that Judge Rader referred to was "to ensure that the
inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject
matter late-rclaimed by him." d. (quoting In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
413 Id.at 1312.
414 Id.
415 See sup-ra Part II.C.1.

416 Rocheste-r II,375 F.3d at 1312. Judge Rader stated:
In the first place, the hypothetical rarely, if ever, happens. No actual case
presents the hypothetical. In both Eli Lilly and Rochester, for instance, the
invention A (rat insulin in Eli Lilly' an assay for Cox 1 and 2 in Rochester) was
enabled and described, but the invention B (human insulin in Eli Lilly a Cox 2
inhibitor in Rochester) was not enabled.

Id.
Id.
Id.
419 Id.
417
418
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radio patent against a TV maker," the "court would properly interpret the claim as
limited to the radio. ' 420 According to Judge Rader, "the Eli Lilly doctrine would
421
instead invalidate the radio patent."
Leaving aside the issues of whether no case has ever presented the hypothetical,
as alleged, and whether the written description requirement is limited to
determinations of priority, there is a difference in application of the written
description requirement between the "Eli Lilly doctrine" and Judge Rader's
resolution of the hypothetical. The difference is that, while under the Eli Lilly
doctrine, the patent would be invalidated for lack of written description of an
"electrical receiver," Judge Rader would hold that the claim, properly interpreted,
would be limited to the radio. This analysis, however, begs the question presented by
Judge Rader of "adequate support." In other words, how much support is required
for a claim to an "electrical receiver" so that it will properly encompass the
embodiment of television? Without reference to enablement of one skilled in the art,
whether sufficiency of written description is posed as an issue of priority or validity,
a question of how much disclosure is sufficient to demonstrate to one skilled in the
art that the inventor was in "possession" of the invention, or to "understand what is
claimed and to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed," remains. To
simply answer that television must be described, as suggested by Judge Rader,
would, in effect, reduce the specification to a claim, and make the presence of claims,
as such, superfluous.
With respect to the occurrence of any case represented by the hypothetical, a
case that closely, if not exactly, parallels the hypothetical is Smythe.422 In this case,
claims reciting use of an "inert fluid immiscible with said liquid samples," 423 was held

by Judge Rich to meet the written description requirement of the first paragraph of
35 U.S.C. § 112 despite the fact that the specification and original claims taught only
"air or other gas which is inert to the liquid."424 The solicitor rejected the claims

under the written description requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112
on the basis that they were broader than the specification because "fluid" embraced
both "liquid" and "gas." 425

Judge Rich reversed the decision, stating: "We cannot

agree with the broad proposition, apparent in the above quoted language, that in
every case where the description of the invention in the specification is narrower
than that in the claim there has been a failure to fulfill the description requirement
in 35 U.S.C. § 112."426
The reasoning applied by Judge Rich stemmed from
predictability in the art: "This is not a case where there is any unpredictability such
420

Id.

421Id.
22

4 In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1973); see also supra Part I.C.1.
423 Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1378.
421Id. at 1377.
425 Id.at 1382. The court set out

that:
The solicitor, explaining the basis of this rejection on the facts of this case, takes
the position that "where the description of the invention is narrower than the
scope of protection sought by the claims []the claims may be rejected under
Section 112, paragraph 1, even though the term "fluid" embraces both "liquid" and
"gas" []and even though it "would not encompass undue experimentation to arrive
at a satisfactory method and structure to employ liquid and gases other than air."

_Td.
426

Id.
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that appellants' description of air or other inert gas would not convey to one skilled in
the art knowledge that appellants invented an analysis system with a fluid
segmentizing

medium."

427

Judge

Rich noted that the issue could have been

addressed under the "enablement" portion of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112:
"[t]he board may have also treated the rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112
under the 'enablement' section of the first paragraph, but the solicitor has narrowed
the rejection by his argument to the 'description' requirement. 428
Presumably, the patent in Smythe could successfully be enforced against
embodiments employing a liquid as the "inert fluid." Therefore, regardless of
whether a "written description requirement" is employed to police priority, as
arguably would be the case in Smythe, there is precedent for embracing certain
embodiments within broad terminology that is supported literally in the specification
only by different embodiments. Judge Rich, in reversing the solicitor, held that one
skilled in the art would understand from the specification the scope of the invention
as later claimed, given the predictability in the art.429 Judge Rader, according to his
analysis of the hypothetical of a claimed electrical receiver embodied by a radio,
apparently would have limited enforcement of the claims in Smythe to the literal
description of the specification, without consideration of enablement by one skilled in
430
the art"
The analogy employed by Judge Rader is not limited to cases that predate Lilly.
For example, Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc., which was decided in March 2004,
prior to Judge Rader's dissent of July 2004, was directed to monoclonal antibodies
that bind to human breast cancer antigen. 431 The language of the claims of the
issued patent appeared in one or more of four earlier applications to which the patent
claimed priority. 432 The district court, prior to trial, construed the claims of the
patent to cover murine, chimeric, and humanized antibodies that bind to c-erbB-2
("HER2") antigen. 433 The first-filed application, although including all of the
language of independent claims 1 and 19 of the issued patent, did not teach chimeric
or humanized antibodies as possible embodiments. 434
The subsequent
427 Id. at 1383.
428 fld.
at 1382 n.2.
429 Id. at 1383.
430 RochesterIII,375 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting).
431 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
432 Id.at 1250-52. The claims at issue were directed to monoclonal antibodies

that bind to a
human breast cancer antigen, also known as c-erbB-2, or HER2. Id. at 1250. The antibodies are
identified in claims 1 and 9 as "monoclonal antibody 454C11 which is produced by the hybridoma
deposited with the American Type Culture Collection having Accession No. HB 8484," and
"monoclonal antibody 520C9 which is produced by the hybridoma deposited with the American Type
Culture having Accession No. HB 8656," respectively. Id. Claim 19 only identifies the monoclonal
antibody as binding to human c-erbB-2 antigen. Id. Monoclonal antibody 454CII and the
hybridoma were disclosed in the first application filed in 1984. Id. at 1251. Monoclonal antibodies
454C11 and 520C9, along with their respective hybridomas were disclosed in a 1985
continuation-in-part (CIP) application.
Id. A 1986 CIP includes these and additional murine
antibodies and hybridomas. Id. All of the antibodies disclosed in the 1984, 1985 and 1986
applications were murine; none were chimeric or humanized. Id. The CIP that became the issued
patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,054,561 (issued Apr. 25, 2000), was filed on June 7, 1995. Id.
433 Id.at 1252 ("Before trial, the district court broadly construed the claims of the '561 patent
to embrace chimeric and humanized antibodies in addition to murine antibodies that bind HER2.").
434Id.at 1251.
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continuation-in-part ("CIP") applications preceding the specification of the issued
patent made reference to monoclonal antibodies as not "limited as regards the source
of the antibody or the manner in which it is made," but did not specifically identify
chimeric or humanized antibodies as possible embodiments. 435 The CAFC stated
that, under In re Hogan, 436 the first-filed application did not need to enable chimeric
or humanized antibodies because such technology was not known at the time. 437 The
CIP applications preceding the issued patent, on the other hand, were held to be
non-enabling because, by the time they were filed, chimeric and humanized antibody
technology was in existence (although "nascent") and, therefore, the specification
438
required disclosure and enablement of those embodiments.
Conversely, with respect to the first-filed application, the court stated that the
issued patent could not claim priority to that application because, as interpreted by
the district court, the issued patent claims were broad enough to embrace chimeric
and humanized antibodies and this technology did not exist at the time of the
first-filed application. 439 Therefore, according to the CAFC, the inventors could not
be in "possession" of the invention and, as a consequence, the specification failed to
meet the written description requirement as applied to the issued claims. Therefore,
the '561 patent was not entitled to the filing date of the first-filed application, despite
the presence of the literal language of the claims in that first-filed application, and
despite the fact that the first-filed application was held to be enabling under the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.440

435

Id. at 1251-52.

436 In -reHogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
437 C ifon Corp., 363 F.3d at 1254 ("Because the first publication documenting the successful

creation of chimeric antibodies occurred after the 1984 application, this sequence of events shows
that this new technology arose after the filing date and thus was, by definition, outside the bounds
of the enablement requirement." (citations omitted)).
438 Id. at 1256-57. The court noted:
Substantial evidence, however, supports the jury's implicit finding that the
technology was still nascent at the time of the 1986 application (as well as, of
course, at the time of the 1985 application) and thus would have still required
undue experimentation ....
Accordingly, the record amply supports the jury's
conclusion that the 1985 and 1986 applications do not enable the claims of the
'561 patent without undue experimentation.

Id.
439

Id. at 1255. The court stated:

Because chimeric antibody technology did not even exist at the time of the 1984
filing, the record conclusively supports that the Chiron scientists did not possess
and disclose this technology in the February 1984 filing. Thus, the '561 patent
cannot claim priority based on the 1984 application because it fails to comply with
the written description requirement.
Id. (citations omitted).
410Id. The court stated:
In this case, the Chiron scientists, by definition, could not have possession of, and
disclose, the subject matter of chimeric antibodies that did not even exist at the
time of the 1984 application. Thus, axiomatically, Chiron cannot satisfy the
written description requirement for new matter appearing in the '561 patent,
namely chimeric antibodies.
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The generic term, "monoclonal antibody," was limited in Chiron under a written
description requirement to embodiments explicitly listed in the specification. 441 The
scope of "possession" precluded subsequent improvements in technology within the
literal language of subsequently issued claims.

442

According to Judge Rader's

reasoning in his dissent in Rochester Il a court would hold that any claims of the
'561 patent issuing from the first-filed application, as opposed to a
continuation-in-part, also would be construed as not encompassing chimeric and
humanized antibodies, because such technology did not exist at the time of filing the
first-filed application. However, to do so effectively confines the scope of claims to the
language of the specification or, in the alternative, causes any issued patent to fail to
meet the written description requirement in the face of technological advancements
since such claims would embrace embodiments that, by definition, could not be
described in the specification.

V. CONCLUSION

There has always been a requirement under United States patent law that
inventors provide a written description of their invention. The various Patent Acts
since 1790, while including the phrase "a specification in writing containing a
description" (Patent Act of 1790) or the phrase "written description" (Patent Acts of
1793, 1836 and 1952), have differed in the components of the requirement. Legal
precedent recognizes the existence of the statutory written description requirement
and analysis of representative case law strongly suggests that comprehension of the
scope of the invention claimed by one skilled in the art underlies the requirement.
The purposes are to notify the public as a warning against infringement and to put
the public in possession of the invention as part of the quidpro quo of obtaining a
limited term of exclusivity.
The concept of possession by the public extends back to cases decided under the
Patent Act of 1793. The test for possession was enablement and understanding by
one skilled in the art of the "principle" or "mode of operation" of the invention, given
the language of the specification filed, to distinguish the invention from subject
matter previously known and to define the exclusive rights of an inventor. 443 These
4 IId.
442 Id. at 1258.
Thus, the '561 patent defined "monoclonal antibody" to include chimeric and
humanized antibodies. Still only a portion of this updated meaning of'monoclonal
antibody' can claim priority to the earliest application.

If required to engage in

claim construction, therefore, this court would face a dilemma: Either construe
the term according to the meaning of the earliest application but contrary to the
explicit definition in the '561 patent or construe the term according to the explicit
definition in the '561 patent but broader than the disclosure of the earliest
application. Again, the latter alternative would run afoul of the prohibition
against importing new matter into later patent documents.

As noted, however,

the record amply supports the jury's verdict of invalidity without reaching this
complex claim construction question.

Id.
443Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323 (Feb. 21, 1793) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §

112 (2000)).
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guiding principles have proved remarkably adept at accommodating extraordinary
advancements in technology for the last two-hundred years. So long as the written
description of claimed subject matter was measured by enablement, in terms of
comprehension by one skilled in the art, satisfaction of the statutory requirement
could be gauged on a case-by-case basis that would permit a patent applicant to draft
a specification meeting that bargain with the public which would entitle him to
protection of claimed subject matter.
Severing the statutory requirement of providing a written description from
enablement is likely to result in holdings that are difficult to reconcile. The decision
by the court in Rochester, which foregoes any analysis of enablement, and Judge
Rader's vigorous dissent, which imposes a written description requirement that
would effectively limit claim scope to the literal language of the specification and
bars enforcement against future improvements in technology, may well represent not
only departures from legal precedent, but also the seeds of a new split in authority at
the CAFC.

